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In this century destroyers have made up a large portion of the U.S. fleet and 
contributed to determining Navy-wide manpower requirements. Destroyers vary 
in mission and capabilities. Plans exist to begin development of the next 
generation destroyer (SC 21). The class is projected to begin construction in 
2003. This study will project the ship-board manpower requirements and 
personnel costs based on historical trends, exploitable technology, and anticipated 
mission. Estimates will vary according to the degree that technology advances. 
Navy organizational constraints also effect manpower requirements and will be 
considered in the estimates. This study projects requirements based upon three 
scenarios involving technology and Navy practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. DEFINITION 
DESTROYER:  Originally, this war ship was constructed as 
a torpedo boat destroyer.  The ships were initially designed 
as an answer to small torpedo boats that came with the advent 
of motorized torpedoes.  Over the years, they were built as 
small, high speed lightly armed, and unarmored jack of all 
trades. Because of their speed and versatility on the high 
seas, they deservedly became the favorite ship of surface 
officers.  Destroyers come in various configurations for 
specific employment; which illustrates the design changes 
necessitated by constantly developing technology.  The class 
has grown enormously in size while retaining the name 
destroyer.  In the 1890's, the first torpedo boats displaced 
only about 100 tons.  The first destroyers, commissioned 
around the turn of the century, were twice that size.  By WWI 
destroyers displaced about 1,000 tons, torpedo boats had 
disappeared, and destroyers had taken on their functions of 
high speed surface attack and anti-submarine patrol.  Larger 
destroyers were known for many years as destroyer leaders or 
(after WWII) frigates in U.S. Navy.  The class took on anti- 
air warfare duties as escorts for carrier task forces. More 
recently, some of the destroyer leaders have been redesignated 
as cruisers, while other destroyer leaders were reclassified 
as destroyers.  The name frigate has been relegated to 
smaller, slower, escort-type ships not suited for aircraft 
carrier escort functions.  Sailors refer to individual 
destroyers in slang terms as a can or a tin can.  (Noel and 
Beach, pp 91-92) 
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B.  OBJECTIVES 
Destroyers have historically made up a large portion of 
the U.S. fleet and contributed to determining Navy-wide 
manpower requirements.  By 1998, given current construction 
and decommissioning rates, destroyers will be the most 
numerous surface combatants in the U.S. Navy (approximately 52 
in number).  Three classes of ships with different sensors and 
weapons will comprise the projected destroyer force:  18 
ARLEIGH BURKE's (DDG 51), 4 KIDD's (DDG 993), and 30 
SPRUANCE's (DD 963).  These multi-purpose ship types vary in 
mission and capabilities.  Plans exist to begin development of 
the next generation destroyer, Twenty First Century Combatant 
(SC 21), in 2003, with completion by 2010.  (Huchting, p49) 
This study will project the manpower requirements of the next 
generation U.S. Navy destroyer based on historical trends, 
exploitable technology, and anticipated mission. 
C.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis involves six chapters.  The first is the 
introduction.  Chapter II includes a broad historical view of 
the destroyer:  (a) ship characteristics, (b) weapon systems, 
(c) engineering, (d) ship control, and (e) communications all 
of which dictate the need for manpower.  In Chapter III, 
vintage destroyers commissioned from 1960 through 1991 are 
analyzed to note the associated operating costs of selected 
ships with respect to manpower and missions.  A projected list 
of design features and components of the SC 21 are introduced 
in Chapter IV highlighting the primary engineering, weapons, 
and operations systems.  In Chapter V, the future manpower 
requirements and costs of SC 21 will be estimated.  Chapter VI 
contains conclusions and recommendations from the results of 
the study.  Manpower cost estimates will be projected over 
time using the Navy Billet Cost Factor model. 
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D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The SC 21 is still in the conceptual stages of design 
with current plans to begin acquisition and construction in 
the year 2003.  (ibid.)  Based upon several articles in the 
Naval Institute Proceedings and conversations with flag 
officers in the acquisition shops in the navy, the most 
prevalent current view is that the ship will be built on an 
ARLEIGH BURKE hull.  Other ship types such as an AEGIS capable 
amphibious ship have been mentioned but do not appear to have 
much support.  As for now, the actual type of ship is yet to 
be determined and many of the systems are still in the early 
stages of development.  The assumption in this study is that 
SC 21 will be designed as a destroyer.  Naval ship manning 
doctrine of a hierarchical "pyramid" personnel structure is 
also assumed in this study.  "The rank structures which will 
be required by the design of the 21st century surface 
combatant must be pyramidal also. . . Ship's crews must 
include enough junior people to train and promote to become 
senior people." (CNO, 1988, p9)  Representative ships of the 
five leading heterogeneous destroyer classes are reviewed to 
note discreet trends in .manning requirements from ships 
commissioned between 1960 and 1992.   Personnel cost estimates 
are based upon 1993 pay and benefits.  The goal of this thesis 
is to provide a long range projection of manpower requirements 
for the SC 21. 
E.  BACKGROUND 
As the shrinking Defense budget effects the military, 
leaders are looking for innovative means to reduce operating 
costs while maintaining or increasing combat effectiveness and 
readiness.  Commercial industry has found success in 
exploiting new technology and reengineering the work place. A 
large portion of the Navy's operating budget is dedicated to 
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ships.  Hundreds of personnel are required to operate and 
maintain each U.S. Navy warship.  Personnel costs were the 
largest single expense in the Navy budget appropriation in 
fiscal year 1993 comprising 28% of the total Navy budget. 
(Congressional Quarterly, p570)  Because of evolutionary 
technological improvements, certain naval manning requirements 
have gone down as new classes of destroyers have replaced old 
ones with similar capability and mission.    < 
Information technology (IT) has recently undergone 
revolutionary changes in cost, capability, and availability. 
Almost no commercial firm has escaped the IT revolution.  Some 
have only gained modestly by employing IT automation to 
replace manual tasks.  Others have reaped tremendous returns 
by adapting their work places to exploit information 
technology. New ways of managing are permitting firms to 
reduce supervisory employees and cut overhead costs.  This 
occurs because firms recognize new opportunities in which 
capital is cheaper than labor.  Successful firms are 
continually optimizing the capital-labor mix in a rapidly 
changing world.  Navy policy makers can stand to gain a 
foothold in the "the battle of the budget" by learning from 
industry and exploiting new IT opportunities which present 
opportunities to optimize the mix of manpower to weapons 
platforms.  Merchant ships in the recent past have taken 
advantage of automation to reduce manning to compete 
economically.  To what extent can the Navy reduce personnel 
costs as merchants have without degrading combat 
effectiveness? 
The Navy budget is developed from perceived national 
security threats and the resulting foreign policy.  Navy force 
structure is assessed and weapon platforms (capital) are 
procured to play the Navy's part in foreign policy.  The 
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weapon platforms "create" the demand for manpower on ships and 
ashore. 
... The navy uses the ship work load (the 
operational and maintenance tasks... in wartime) 
and staffing standards (the amount of time and 
skills needed to perform these tasks) . (GAO, 1986, 
p2) 
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF DESTROYERS 
This chapter will review some of the major classes of 
destroyers that stand out in U.S. Navy history.  It will 
introduce some of the ship systems and weapons that have been 
impacting enlisted and officer manning trends.  The data 
employed for projecting next generation destroyer manning 
begin with ships commissioned in 1960.  This chapter provides 
a background of systems used to arrive at the projections. 
Table 2-1, provided at the end of the chapter, briefly 
describes the major destroyers in service since the mid 
1930's.  Hopefully, this will provide the reader with a better 
background into destroyer systems that can impact manning 
decisions. 
A. THE SHIP CLASSES 
The first Navy destroyer, USS BAINBRIDGE (DD 1) was 
commissioned in 1903.  With two 4 pound guns and two torpedo 
tubes, she was built to attack larger war ships.  This first 
destroyer displaced 420 tons and used coal fired boilers with 
reciprocating engines for propulsion.  The early ships were 
too tender for open ocean duty and had to return to port to 
refuel.  Larger ships were built to allow better range and sea 
keeping abilities.  Steam turbines replaced reciprocating 
engines and oil replaced coal as preferred fuel by .1910. (U.S. 
Naval History Division, p8)  The evolutionary change in fuel 
would allow prolonged at-sea endurance, using underway 
replenishment techniques to transfer fuel, food, and 
ammunition also in 1910. (Fee, Naval Engineering and American 
Seapower, p80)  In 1915, prior to U.S. involvement in World 
War I, congress first authorized mass producing destroyers in 
substitution for the more expensive capital warships 
(battleships and cruisers.)  The resulting World War I vintage 
destroyers were known as "Flushdeckers" and were constructed 
7 
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primarily to perform large scale torpedo attacks against 
capital warships.  Five technical breakthroughs improved the 
destroyer's capability.  Depth charges and primitive 
hydrophones gave the destroyers better capability against 
submarines.  Gun directors, gyro-stabilization of the gun 
director, and the mechanical range keeper greatly improved 
destroyer gunfire effectiveness.  The early U.S. destroyers 
proved successful as convoy escorts by providing smoke screens 
and defending against German U-boat attacks. 
Their high length to beam ratio gave them improved range 
and speed needed for torpedo attack against capital war ships. 
However they were poorly suited for antisubmarine work where 
agility was needed.  The average flushdecker had a wider 180- 
degree turning radius at higher speeds than did a contemporary 
battleship!  (Reilly, pll) 
By 1922, there were over 265 flushdeck destroyers in 
service, however the post war drawdown saw numbers reduced to 
approximately 101 by 1923 and no new destroyers were built 
until 1932.  In the mean time an important but indirect combat 
escort mission however developed for destroyers with the 
advent of sea-based aviation as the Navy developed and 
operated aircraft carriers.  This mission was as lifeguard for 
the carriers during aircraft launch and recovery operations. 
The FARRAGUT (DD 348) class, "gold platers" as they were 
known in the fleet, comprised the next generation U.S. 
destroyer.  These ships emphasized guns over torpedoes as the 
preferred weapon in surface engagements.  Numerous technical 
advances were employed to enhance the weapon systems.  Some of 
the "gold platers'" advanced features included electro- 
hydraulic gun mounts, longitudinal hull framing, and 
superheated steam boilers.  The guns were 5inch 38 caliber, 
bigger than the WWI destroyers.  Longitudinal hull framing was 
prim ily to perform large scale torpedo at acks against 
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employed (and still is) for strength.  Superheated steam 
provides much more potential energy than non-superheated or 
"saturated steam" which meant that these destroyers were more 
powerful and faster than previous classes. Various types of 
radar were back fitted on several of the class in later years. 
Several other classes of destroyers followed and bore strong 
resemblances to the FARRAGUT class.  These destroyers 
displaced from 1,500 to 1,850 tons to conform to the 
constraints of the 1921 Washington Naval Treaty which limited 
naval fleets in terms of ship numbers, types, and tonnage. 
The FARRAGUTs and follow-on ships, ninety seven in all, were 
authorized for the main purpose of providing employment to a 
depressed U.S. economy. (Reilly, p24)  These prewar destroyers 
would serve in World War II and the surviving ships were 
decommissioning immediately after the war in the draw down. 
The FARRAGUT class and her derivatives had one recurring 
problem during the war, poor stability. 
The FLETCHER (DD 445) class was the culmination of 
1930's experimentation and trade-offs of weapons, stability, 
and speed.  In 1940, there was a consensus in naval 
leadership which agreed to the importance of anti-air (AA) and 
anti-submarine defense capability for destroyers.  The class 
was initially armed with five 5" 38 calibre dual purpose (AA 
and anti-surface) guns, one AA gun mount, anti-ship torpedoes, 
and depth charges.  Wartime experience dictated increasing AA 
capability at the expense of one of the 5 inch guns.  The 
FLETCHERS were back-fitted with the newly developed Combat 
Information Center (CIC), as well as radar, for centralized 
tactical decision making in fighting the ship beginning in 
1943 as ships' schedules permitted.  Following World War II, 
this destroyer class would see improvements in radar, fire 
control systems, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weaponry. 
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The FLETCHERS would see action in the Korean conflict and on 
into the 1960's. 
The ALLEN M. SUMNER (DD 692) and GEARING (DD 710) 
classes were improvement on the FLETCHER design.  The largest 
U.S. destroyers in the fleet in World War' II, they displaced 
2,200 tons and closely resembled the FLETCHER class profile. 
The GEARING class was slightly longer than the ALLEN M. SUMNER 
and also carried more fuel. Both classes were designed to 
carry radar and were built with a CIC.  These ships (and the 
FLECTCHER's) used 600 psi steam propulsion which was more 
powerful than the "gold plater" engineering plants and proved 
reliable over the years.  These ships saw similar postwar 
evolutionary weapon and sensor improvements as the FLETCHERS. 
"Given the huge estimated requirements for escorts in future 
war,the U.S. Navy was fortunate in having many large 
destroyers suitable for conversion."  (Friedman, 1986, p46) 
Seventy nine GEARING, thirty three ALLEN M. SUMNER, and three 
FLETCHER class ships would be overhauled in two versions of 
the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) program in 
the early 1960's.  This program updated the weapon systems by 
introducing ASW torpedoes and variable depth sonar.  The 
mission of these destroyers had now transitioned from mainly 
surface combat to ASW escort duty.  The longer GEARING class 
received the Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC).  All of the FRAM 
ships were modified by adding a light weight flight deck and 
small hangar to support the Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter 
(DASH.)  DASH proved itself unreliable and was never actively 
employed in the fleet.  FRAM I, funded for the GEARING class, 
was designed to add eight to ten years to the platforms.  The 
ALLEN M. SUMNER and FLETCHER reduced scale FRAM II package was 
intended to extend the useful life of the remnants by five 
years. (Preston, pp 118, 119)  The GEARING class would serve 
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in the active fleet longer than any other destroyer class, 
spanning from 1943 to the early 1980's. 
The MITSCHER (DL 2) class destroyer "leaders" were built 
immediately following World War II to fill a perceived gap in 
the light cruiser force.  These ships were larger than the 
destroyers of the war but smaller than cruisers, displacing 
approximately 4,500 tons.  The MITSCHER class had similar 
firepower to the war time destroyers.  They were armed with 
two 5" 54 calibre dual purpose guns, two 3" 70 calibre AA 
guns, ASW torpedoes, and weapon alfa (a rocket propelled ASW 
depth bomb.)  This class utilized the first fully automatic, 
self loading 5 inch gun mounts.  The MITSCHER class 
superstructures were constructed from aluminum while the hull 
remained steel to reduce topside weight and increase 
stability.  1200 psi steam was first introduced in this class 
of destroyer to allow for higher speeds than before. 
Unfortunately, the higher pressure steam posed many problems 
with maintenance and would hinder reliability.  This class was 
also the first destroyer fitted with bow mounted sonar to 
enhance ASW capability.  Two of the class received 
modifications for the tartar MK 13 anti-air warfare (AAW) 
guided missile weapon systems and were redesignated as guided 
missile destroyers in 1968 and 1969.  In 1955 the designations 
DL and DLG were changed to frigate and guided missile frigate. 
In 1975 the designations reverted back to destroyer and 
guided missile destroyer.1  (Polmar, 1993, pl31) 
1
 In 1975, the term frigate replaced the designation for 
destroyer escort (DE and DEG), smaller and less capable than 
the destroyer in the U.S. Navy. The designations DE and DEG 
were replaced by FF and FFG as frigate nomenclature 
respectively.  (Tarpgaard, pp 3, 4) 
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The FORREST SHERMAN (DD 931) class were built from 1953 
to 1956 as the first post-war destroyer.  Slightly larger than 
the GEARING class, the FORREST SHERMAN had improved weaponry 
compared to the earlier generations with three automatic 5" 54 
calibre guns, torpedoes, and Hedgehog ASW mortars.  In the 
1960's several ships in this class underwent modifications to 
improve either their ASW or AAW capabilities against the 
respective increased threats. Unfortunately, the FORREST 
SHERMAN'S were constructed at a time when submarine and jet 
aircraft made them all but obsolete. Eight of the class 
received ASROC in place of their second 5 inch gun mount. 
Four of the class were converted to guided missile destroyers 
by replacing the second 5 inch gun mount with a MK 13 Tartar 
missile launcher and associated support equipment.  The last 
DD 931 class ship was decommissioned in 1988 marking an end of 
an era.  The FORREST SHERMAN class was the last class of U.S. 
destroyer built to conduct surface combat primarily against 
other surface ships within the horizon on the high seas. 
The first U.S. destroyers built specifically as guided 
missile ships were the COONTZ (DDG 37, ex DLG 6) class in 1960 
and 1961.  These ships were modeled after the MITSCHER class 
destroyer leader.  The largest destroyers built prior to 1973, 
they displaced 6150 tons at full load.  The class had one 5 
inch 54 calibre gun, two 3 inch 50 calibre AAW guns (later 
removed), torpedoes, ASROC, and MK 10 Mod 0 terrier missile 
launcher.  The missiles were later modified to Standard 
missiles.  The COONTZ class possessed more sensors than any 
previous destroyer with two surface search radars, two air 
search radars, two keel mounted sonar (PAIR), 3 fire control 
radars, and electronic warfare sensors.  The Naval Tactical 
Data System (NTDS) was first tested aboard two COONTZ class 
ships in 1961 and 1962.  By 1977 all ten members of the class 
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had received AAW modernization and NTDS.  The last COONTZ 
class ship was decommissioned in the spring of 1994. 
To counter increased threats from longer ranged threats 
from nuclear submarines and jet aircraft, the CHARLES F. ADAMS 
(DDG 2) class guided missile destroyers were based on an 
improved FORREST SHERMAN design.  The class displaced 4825 
tons at full load.  They were fitted with the tartar missile 
system, ASROC, torpedoes and two 5 inch 54 calibre guns. 
Twenty three ADAMS class were commissioned from 1961 to 1964. 
DDG 2 through DDG 14 possessed the MK 11 Mod 0 twin armed 
missile launcher.  DDG 15 through DDG 24 employed the MK 13 
single arm missile launcher.  Both systems had the same firing 
rates and were later upgraded to launch the Standard missile. 
All of the ships received extensive electronic 
countermeasures suites and modernized 3-d air search radars. 
The ADAMS class are the last generation of steam powered U.S. 
destroyer built.  The final ship of the class was 
decommissioned in the spring of 1993. 
The SPRUANCE (DD 963) class represent the "new look" of 
the U.S. Navy destroyer.  First commissioned in 1975, the 
class was designed specifically for ASW.  Designed as 
replacement for the GEARING (DD 710) and ALLEN M. SUMNER (DD 
692) classes, the SPRUANCE class was initially armed with two 
5 inch 54 calibre guns, ASROC, torpedoes,  light airborne 
multi purpose system (LAMPS) helicopters, and the basic point 
defense missile system (BPDMS).  At 8040 tons, these ships are 
over twice the displacement of most World War II vintage 
destroyers and employ vast technical improvements over 
previous classes in terms of engineering, stability, acoustic 
signature, and excess space for later addition of weapon 
systems.  This class is also the first large U.S. combatant to 
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generation. Automation has been used in more systems than 
before allowing crew reduction over previous ships of similar 
size and capability.  Initially, the class was heavily 
criticized for having relatively limited fire power compared 
to other contemporary destroyers.  Since then, the Vulcan 
Phalanx close in weapon system (CIWS) and Harpoon anti-ship 
missiles have been installed aboard all SPRUANCE class ships. 
Beginning in the 1980's, the class received added firepower 
with the addition of the Tomahawk anti-ship missile/Tomahawk 
land attack missile (TASM/TLAM).  Twenty four of the ships 
received the MK 41 Mod 1 vertical launching system (VLS) which 
has the capacity 61 missiles (TASM, TLAM, or ASROC).  The 
other seven ships of the class have eight TASM/TLAM in armored 
box launchers (ABL) located topside.  The SPRUANCE class 
features updated electronic systems, bow mounted sonar, 
tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS), air search radar (2-d), 
gun fire control radar, electronic warfare (EW) sensors, and 
NTDS. 
The KIDD (DDG 993) class comprises four ships very 
similar to the SPRUANCE class in appearance.  This class was 
originally built for the Shah of Iran as AAW platforms from 
the SPRUANCE design.  The U.S. government appropriated 
funding to purchase the ships in 1979 after Iran canceled the 
order.  Commissioned in 1981, these ships appear almost 
identical to the DD 963 class except for their two air search 
radars, missile fire control radar, and two MK 26 twin armed 
surface to air missile launchers fore and aft.  Designed for 
operations in the Persian Gulf, they were built with increased 
air conditioning capacity and have dust filters over all air 
intakes.  They have similar attributes to the SPRUANCE class 
with respect to ASW capability, Harpoon missiles, CIWS, and 
LAMPS. The only ASW sensor which the class lacks capability is 
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TACTAS.  The KIDD class has missile capacity for 68 medium 
range Standard surface to air missiles and displaces 9574 tons 
at full load. 
The newest addition to the U.S. destroyer ranks is the 
ARLIEGH BURKE (DDG 51) class.  These are the first post World 
War II destroyers built with steel superstructures.  They also 
have 130 tons of kevlar armor plating to protect vital spaces 
and sport partial chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) 
protection, a first for U.S. warships.  The ARLIEGH BURKE 
class was built to enhance fleet air defense using the Aegis 
air defense system.  They have a similar engineering plant to 
the SPRUANCE and KIDD classes but a different top side 
silhouette.  The top side difference is that the air search 
radar faces are mounted on the forward superstructure instead 
of a rotating dish mounted on a mast aft of the forward 
superstructure.  Shorter and wider than her two immediate 
predecessors, ARLIEGH BURKE was built to produce a smaller 
radar cross-section and allow for more firepower.  Armament 
aboard the DDG 51 class includes fore and aft VLS (90 cells) 
with the capability of launching Standard surface to air 
missiles, TASM/TLAM, ASROC, 8 Harpoon launchers, torpedoes, 
one 5 inch 54 calibre gun, and CIWS.  Sensors include the SPY- 
1(D) multi-function radar, bow mounted sonar, TACTAS, surface 
search radar, EW receivers, and the MK 99 Aegis fire control 
system.  These ships displace 8422 tons at full load.  The 
first of the class was commissioned in 1992 and is tentatively 
scheduled to remain in production through 1998.  Beginning 
with DDG 68, the class will receive Joint Tactical Information 
Distribution System (JTIDS) and Tactical Data Information 
Exchange Subsystem (TADIX) which will increase tactical 
decision communication and decision making capabilities. An 
upgraded EW suite and improved surface to air missile will be 
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added to broaden the air defense envelope.  These later ships 
will also have the ability to refuel and rearm LAMPS 
helicopters. 
B.  MANPOWER AND WEAPON SYSTEMS RELATIONSHIPS 
The past thirty years have seen many naval technical 
evolutionary developments in weapon systems which have carried 
over into destroyer manpower requirements.  These developments 
have improved combat effectiveness and permitted capital to be 
substituted for personnel. Automated gun mounts were the 
first fully exploited technology aboard destroyers to allow 
substitution. Brought about in the 1950's, this evolutionary 
change saw firing rates and weapon accuracy increase.  The 
early automated gun mounts allowed local control of the mount 
in the event of gun director control failure.  Gun mounts 
continued to evolve in terms of automation and personnel 
reduction.  Current Navy guns employed in the destroyer fleet 
are fully automated and require drastically smaller crews than 
in the past. 
Fire control systems evolved beginning in World War I to 
improve gun fire accuracy.  The U.S. first capitalized on 
targeting developments in 1942 with the MK 56 gun fire control 
system that proliferated throughout the destroyer force.  The 
system was designed for use against (non-maneuvering) subsonic 
aircraft and surface targets.  Fire control systems have 
replaced marksmen on the gun mounts.  Fire control systems 
over the years have absorbed operators as the gun mounts have 
seen losses. These systems perform guidance functions for 
missiles that have become the primary air defense mechanism in 
the past thirty years.  Computer operated fire control systems 
aboard ship have not yet seen a decrease in manpower 
requirements for several reasons, but the potential is there. 
Warriors have realized that there is greater utility in 
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Missile systems have traditionally not required as many 
persons to operate as gun systems.  All U.S. Navy destroyers 
with operational guided missile systems we're designed with 
fully automated launching systems.  The tactical crews in 
monitoring missile preparation during launch have hovered 
around three persons until the arrival of the vertical launch 
system (VLS.)  With VLS proliferating, the only real need for 
guided missile technicians is to perform preventive and 
corrective maintenance. 
Radar has evolved and seen increased requirements for 
personnel to maintain, operate, and monitor.  A necessary 
input for all major surface and air fire control systems, 
radar has expanded from two dimensional (range and bearing) to 
three dimensional (range, bearing, and altitude.)  The newest 
and most advanced radars are phased array (fixed) and provide 
continual 360 degree coverage to assess the threat 
environment.  Radars are very complex systems that consist of 
sender/receiver antennae, display monitors, power supplies, 
and data distribution devices.  Currently, ships must carry 
several types of radar to perform different functions whether 
navigation, surface search, air search, or fire control.  The 
electronic and IT revolutions have yielded vast improvements 
in radar effectiveness. Physics has not allowed using an all 
purpose radar to perform all destroyer missions.  To maintain 
military flexibility, destroyers employ many different radars. 
They have a formidable maintenance and monitoring requirement 
which have seen increases in manpower.  IT has the potential 
to reduce the current need of radar display observers 
significantly. 
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Electronic warfare (EW) was first employed by blocking 
enemy radio transmissions by "jamming" signals. EW has 
increased in sophistication over the years.  In the U.S. Navy 
EW consists of electronic support measures (ESM), electronic 
countermeasures (ECM), and electronic counter-countermeasures 
(ECCM).  ESM equipment consists primarily of receiver antennae 
and the supporting computers that process and identify the 
signals.  ECM equipment is composed of chaff (radar reflective 
material) launchers.  The chaff will present a radar cross- 
section hopefully more seductive to enemy fire control or 
missile terminal homing radar to evade impact.  The DD 963 
class ships have an added capacity with high frequency 
direction finding (HFDF) interception and identification 
equipment that increases manpower requirements over the other 
platforms.  Current fleet EW equipment is not labor intensive 
compared to radar and does not require much in terms of 
operation or maintenance personnel requirements. 
ASW has been in destroyer vocabulary since World War I. 
All U.S. destroyers since the 1930's have used some form of 
sonar and under sea weapons.  Arguably, the most valuable 
asset added to surface ship ASW capabilities is the light 
airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS.)  LAMPS is the 
integration of ship surveillance equipment:  bow mounted 
sonar, tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS), and ASW equipped 
helicopters.  The system can analyze submarine data from many 
sources and interpret to provide near real time submarine 
targeting solutions for fire control using either helicopter 
or ship borne weapons.  LAMPS was first employed in the 
1970's.  The largest ASW requirements in manpower involve the 
helicopter and launching and recovering the TACTAS.  Torpedo 
maintenance is low and launching is highly automated.  Sonar 
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systems have similar observation and maintenance requirements 
to radar except that the sensors are submerged. 
The personnel trends in the weapon systems dimension of 
destroyers show people shifting from ammo handling on the gun 
mounts and the depth charge racks to monitoring radar scopes 
and weapon consoles.  Generally, the labor routines have 
shifted from primarily operating weapons topside to 
maintaining them from within the skin of the ship. In terms of 
long-range fire power, today's destroyers are more formidable 
than ever before. 
C.  MANPOWER TRENDS IN ENGINEERING SYSTEMS 
The predominating naval engineering systems that 
involved manpower changes over the years centered in the 
propulsion and power generation systems.  Coal fired boilers 
had proliferated in the navy since discovering the utility of 
steam in the nineteenth century until 1909.  Naval engineers 
discovered in underway experiments that fuel oil was more 
efficient than coal, yielded greater power, and required fewer 
men to operate.  John J. Fee quoted several articles dated in 
1909 and 1911 from the American Society of Naval Engineers 
Journal: 
In a 24-hour period, 13.7 tons of fuel oil 
were used, in comparison with earlier trials where 
30 tons of coal were needed. Moreover, the 8-knot 
speed of the VENUS using coal was increased to 
11.75 knots using oil. . . Fewer men and equipment 
were necessary when fuel oil was used for heating 
boilers.  Oil was pumped to the boilers, unlike 
coal that had to be moved by hand from coal bunkers 
by stokers. A one-third reduction in boiler 
tenders, one of the most undesirable and dangerous 
jobs on a ship, was achieved.  (Fee, Naval 
Engineering and American Seapower, 1989) 
By 1960, after many years of experimentation, 1200 psi 
steam boilers had replaced 600 and 800 psi as the power plant 
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of choice destroyer ship builders.  Steam plants aboard navy 
ships are rather complex and as a thumb rule consist of the 
following equipment: 
Propulsion boilers, propulsion turbines, 
condensers, reduction gears, pumps, forced draft 
blowers, deairating feed tanks, and other auxiliary 
machinery units that directly serve the major 
propulsion units.  Turbo-generators and their 
auxiliary condensers are usually located in the 
propulsion spaces . . . (Jolliff and Robertson, 
pl8) 
The steam destroyers used diesel generators for 
emergency power in the event of electric plant failure.  These 
"emergency generators" were usually located in a remote 
auxiliary space away from the main engineering spaces. 
In the 1950's, engineers developed and implemented 
automatic combustion control systems to maintain boilers at 
1200 psi and 950 degrees F under all operating conditions 
using low pressure air and pneumatically controlled valves. 
"By 1972, combustion controls had become a reliable standard 
feature of all steam plants."  (Barnes, Naval Engineering and 
American Seapower, 1989, p285)  The controls greatly reduced 
the number of operators to operate the steam plant under 
normal conditions.  In the event of a "control air" casualty, 
personnel had to operate the valves by hand. 
Marine power plants are unquestionably headed 
in the direction of greater reliability, improved 
maintainability, and increased automation, at least 
to the extent that automation will lower manning 
levels and reduce casualties related to operator 
error while maintaining sufficient personnel to 
counter battle damage.  (Jolliff and Robertson, 
pl8) 
In 1975, the U.S. first employed marine gas turbines for 
propulsion aboard destroyers.  Gas turbines required less 
mechanical support equipment than the steam plants. There was 
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a trade-off however, for electronic monitoring and support 
equipment that required fewer operating and maintenance 
personnel than the steam supporting equipment.  Destroyer gas 
turbine engineering plants will -normally have propulsion gas 
turbines, reduction gears, pumps, fuel oil purifying systems, 
gas turbine generators with auxiliary boilers in the main 
engineering spaces.  Note that diesel generators are not 
included with equipment listing as the gas turbine generators 
are independent from the propulsion prime movers unlike the 
steam system.  Counter to the automatic boiler combustion 
controls, the gas turbine electronic and hydraulic control 
systems are organic to the engine.  No manual operation of 
current navy gas turbines can be performed. 
Notable decreases in the engineering sizes of later 
destroyers can be directly attributed to the "moderate 
automation" of the power plant by machinery improvements. As 
of 1994, gas turbines have completely replaced steam plants in 
the destroyer navy. 
D.  SHIP CONTROL 
Traditionally, the ship's bridge has been the location 
for commanding warships in battle. 
Safety of the ship (collision avoidance) and 
the crew (when many sailors routinely worked on 
exposed decks), and fighting the ship in a close-in 
surface action, are the requirements or "drivers" 
that have kept the conn on the bridge.  (CNO, Ships 
Operational Characteristics Study, 1988, pl8) 
Since electricity was introduced to naval ships around 
the turn of the century, the navy has used some form of 
electrical system to "drive" ships.  The 1960's, saw great 
advances in electronics which were applied to shipboard 
navigation. 
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Electronics provided the means for great 
advances in navigation, as well.  Shore based 
navigation systems such as Loran and Omega became 
more accurate and more automated.  Earth orbiting 
satellites became beacons ... As the period 
ended, satellite systems capable of defining a 
ship's position within a few yards, with little 
more effort than pushing a button, were a looming 
reality.  (Barnes, Naval Engineering and American 
Seapower, 1989, p293) 
Over the years, destroyer bridge teams have "driven" the 
ship with an average of ten personnel on watch.  This total 
includes: 
one officer of the deck, one conning officer, one 
quartermaster, one boatswain's mate, one helmsman, one lee 
helm, three lookouts, and one messenger.  Navy bridge teams 
have used this composition for many years without regard to 
any advances in nautical technology. Any discussion of ship 
control automation and consolidation would be incomplete 
without acknowledging the major findings and contributions in 
this area made by the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) 
operational evaluation conducted aboard USS McCANDLESS (FF 
1084) during the period November 1976 to January 1977.  (CNO, 
1988, pl9) 
It was determined that a significant reduction 
in bridge manning could be achieved by 
consolidating and integrating communication and 
displays into a centralized work station and 
automating certain piloting, navigation, collision 
avoidance, and logging functions... The at-sea 
evaluation of the (IBS) design demonstrated that 
bridge watch functions can be performed as 
effectively or more effectively, with significantly 
fewer people.  (Yurso, Naval Engineering and 
American Seapower, 1989, p354) 
Unfortunately, IBS was not embraced during its 
operational evaluation by navy leadership.  Commanders, at the 
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time, felt that the reduced bridge manning requirements would 
not lead to reduced crew sizes.  This, in turn, would not lead 
to long term savings using capital-labor substitution. 
While acknowledging that "some reduction in 
bridge personnel during certain conditions of 
readiness is possible," (Commander Naval Surface 
Forces Atlantic Fleet) questioned whether "this 
reduction will result in reduced shipboard manning 
..." Another factor cited was the "cost 
involved, and the higher priority requirement for 
weapon and sensor development and acquisition." 
Certainly these factors were valid at the time, but 
times have changed and in a totally new time frame 
of the SOCS ship design real savings of people are 
possible and very real improvements in 
effectiveness can be realized."  (CNO, 1988, p20) 
E.  COMMUNICATIONS 
After the sinking of the TITANIC in 1912, the U.S. 
Congress passed a law that required all ships of a certain 
displacement be equipped with some type of wireless radio. 
(Fee, Naval Engineering and American Seapower, 1989, p79)  By 
the 1920's, voice radio was beginning to show advances that 
would realize value aboard ship. 
With the advent of the wireless, radio 
telephone and radio telegraph went to sea. . . In 
1940 . . . teletype went to sea.  Other than on 
line encryption, the use of communication 
satellites, single-side ban, and one or two other 
innovations, there have been relatively few major 
changes in naval communications, especially in 
capacity and equipment commonality. As a matter of 
fact radio room configuration and equipment 
population have proven to be resistant to change. 
(CNO, 1988, p54) 
The SOCS reviewed trends of communications operators, 
radioman (RM) rating.  They observed work center manning and 
message traffic load capacity.  The ship classes analyzed were 
the DDG 51 and the DD 931.  The findings indicated a single 
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radioman working alone aboard DD 931 could handle 150 messages 
per day.  The same radioman in DDG 51 could only handle 100 
messages in a single day. Although the conditions are not 
really the same, message handling procedures have not improved 
dramatically.  They certainly have not kept pace with the 
traffic volume increase.  (CNO, 1988, p57) 
One of the main problems with radio communication 
technology in the navy has been a lack of coordination in the 
development of various hardware components. Each type of 
transmission requires a different device to transmit and 
receive.  Some equipment employed for like purposes on the 
same frequency may be noncompatible.  Often, incremental 
improvements in equipment are performed which can result in 
awkward layouts of radio rooms that make processing message 
traffic arduous. 
Users demand dedicated circuits that they can 
control ... The demand for dedicated circuits 
appears to have driven the configuration of today's 
communication suites.  (ibid.) 
Visual line of sight (LOS) communication has remained 
unchanged for many years in the navy, however SOCS 
recommended: "that the operational suitability, technological 
risk, and cost of suitable (LOS communications) be evaluated; 
and that one system be selected for R&D funding.  The use of 
flag status signals can and should be retained independent of 
an improved LOS signaling system.  (ibid, p63)  This 
revolutionary change would involve the eventual removal of a 
navy occupation, signalman (SM) from destroyers and eventually 
the rest of the fleet.  If this technical advance were to 
occur prior to 2003, then the topside ship design could be 
radically changed to improve stealth capability in addition to 
realizing manpower savings. 
24 
radio an orki  l  ar  l  dle 150 essages 
per day. he s  o   l  l  handle 100 
messages i  a si l  y. lt   nditi s are not 
really the sa e, ess  dli  r ur s e ot i proved 
dra aticall . e  rt l   t t ce ith the 
tr ffi  l e se. , 8, 57) 
One of t e ai  s it  i  munication 
technology i  t   s   f r i ation in the 
develop ent f r  ar  ponents. ach type of 
trans issio  r i  i t i   tra s it and 
receive. o e i ent pl   r ses on the 
same freque c  a   compatible. ft , i cre ental 
improve ents i  ent orm  hi  can result in 
awkward lay ts f i s t ak  ssi  essage 
us.
sers de a  i t i it  t t  can 
contr l . . .  a i t  ir its 
appears t   fi r t  f t ay's 
co municati it . .
Visual line f i t ) municati   r ai ed 
unchanged f r a  r y, ever S CS 
recommended: ~t t  erat l it ili , t ological 
risk, and cost f i l L munications) e e aluated; 
and that one system  i . he use of 
flag status si l   l n  in e endent of 
an i proved  i l e . , ) his 
revolutionar  c  oul t al re oval of a 
navy occupation, signalm S ) rom t r   entually 
the rest of t  l t. i l ce ere to 
occur pri r t  ,  i  could be 
radically change  t  i r abilit  i  a ition to 
zin a er i s. 
Internal communication developments have evolved 
following the Spanish-American War and voice tubes and "sound 
powered" phones replaced messengers as the primary means of 
station to station internal communication.  As electricity was 
introduced, voice amplifying intercoms spread throughout the 
fleet.  Even with the technical advancement, few believed that 
personnel reductions could occur through improving interior 
communications until the mid 1960's.  Purdue University was 
funded through Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to 
evaluate the possibility of automating several processes 
aboard destroyer escorts in an effort to reduce manning 
requirements.  The proposed automation involves the 
installation of four mini-computers, thirteen micro- 
processors, four "data highways," as well as sensors, 
actuators, and associated displays.  However to get the 
savings, what is important is not the number of individuals 
saved by the automation, but the kinds of personnel saved. 
(Shishko, 1975, ppl4-15)  The study demonstrated that 
improvements in interior communications could yield personnel 
reductions and savings over the long term if implemented 
during the initial construction of an entire ship class.  The 
costs of back fitting such a system aboard already active 
ships out weighed the savings in personnel trade-offs 
throughout the expected lifetime of the ships.  Interestingly, 
the proposal only covered the destroyer escorts and was not 
considered for any destroyers.  It was not implemented in the 
fleet.  The commercial shipping industry has taken advantage 
of a variant of this system. 
In 1994, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) began 
development of the Integrated Interior Communications and 
control System (IC)2.  This system is designed to: 
•collect and distribute incoming and outgoing traffic 
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•connect all shipboard components, systems, and 
departments 
•pass all data, information, voice, video, and orders 
between on board users. 
(IC)2 provides information to the Commanding Officer (CO) 
to assist in exercising command and control within the ship. 
It aids in his decision making process and enables the passing 
of orders by supplying fused and high level information rather 
than simply raw data. Ultimately development and 
implementation of (IC)2 will provide, the CO and Executive 
Officer (XO) with real-time status information from multiple 
sources.  Potential systems to be interfaced in a "user 




•Propulsion and electrical plant 
•Administration 
•Others 
This interfacing is to occur using personal computer 
(PC) based technology with fiber optic local area networks 
(LAN).  Current goals are to apply the finalized (IC)2 system 
to ships beginning in fiscal year 1995.  (Wood, 1994)  No 
evaluations have been made to estimate possible manpower 
reductions yet. 
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TREND DATA OF U.S. NAVY DESTROYERS 1934 -1991 
SHIP COSTIN DISPLACEMENT MANNING WEAPONS MISSION 
CLASS MILLIONS OF CONSTANT IN TONS (FULL LOAD) 
FY93 DOLLARS 1 
00348 54 1500 167 5 GUNS ASUW 
1934-38 TORPEDOES 
00445 101 2750 250-300 peace 5 GUNS ASUW 
1942-43 350 war TORPEDOES after FRAM 
rcvd FRAM ASW 
00692 69 3000 350 war 6 GUNS ASUW 
1943-44 (less armament) 12 AAW GUNS after FRAM 
rcvd FRAM ASW 
tv 
-J 00710 67 3300 257 peace 6 GUNS ASUW 
1944-46 (less armament) 350 war 12AAWGUNS after FRAM 
rcvd FRAM ASW 
DL2 150 4400 350 peace 2 GUNS ASUW& 
1953-54 440 war 4 AAW GUNS ASW 
WEAPONALFA 
00931 4200 337 3 GUNS ASUW& 
1955-58 4 AAW GUNS ASW 





(TARTAR MISSILES) AAW 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SHIP COST IN DISPLACEMENT MANNING WEAPONS MISSION CLASS MILLIONS OF CONSTANT IN TONS (FULL LOAD) 
FY93 DOLLARS 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note 1. Costs in constant 1993 dollars are derived from the summary estimates of fixed reproducable tangible wealth 
in the United States. (Survey of Current Business, Department of Commerce, August 1994). . 






III. HISTORICAL MANNING AND COST COMPARISON OF U.S. NAVY 
DESTROYERS 
This chapter summarizes recent destroyer class manning 
trends.  This summary could be helpful for estimating the 
manpower requirements of future destroyers.  Chapter IV will 
discuss possible advances in various systems and the 
manpower requirements associated with one proposal.  Chapter 
V will project the manning and cost requirements of the 
future prototype. 
A.  REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter provides raw manning and manpower cost 
requirements for seven destroyers commissioned from 1960 and 
1991.  All costs will be listed in constant 1993 (FY93) 
dollars.  The sample includes 5 destroyer classes.  Each 
ship in this sample has a unique configuration representing 
a broad spectrum of the classes listed.  This sample 
contains the following ships:  USS MAHAN (DDG 42), USS LYNDE 
MCCORMICK (DDG 8), USS BENJAMIN STODDERT (DDG 22), USS 
MERRILL (DD 976), USS CUSHING (DD 985), USS KIDD (DDG 993), 
and USS ARLIEGH BURKE (DDG 51).  The ship classes and a 
brief description are listed in Table 3-1. 
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DDG 37 USS MAHAN 
(DDG 42) 
1960 STEAM MK 10 
TERRIER 
DDG 2 USS LYNDE 
MCCORMICK 
(DDG 8) 
1961 STEAM MK 11 
TARTAR 




1964 STEAM MK 13 
TARTAR 
DD 963 USS MERRILL 
(DD 976) 
1978 GAS TURBINE TOMAHAWK 
(ABL) 
DD 963 USS CUSHING 
(DD 985) 
1979 GAS TURBINE TOMAHAWK 
(VLS) 
DDG 993 USS KIDD 
(DDG 993) 
1981 GAS TURBINE MK 2 6 
STANDARD 




1991 GAS TURBINE AEGIS (VLS) 
STANDARD & 
TOMAHAWK 
Table 3-1 Brief Descriptions of Sample Ship 
Characteristics. 
...The Navy uses the ship workload (the 
operational and maintenance tasks which assigned 
ship personnel would have to perform in wartime) 
and staffing standards (the amount of time and 
skills needed to perform these tasks that identify 
the number of positions needed to accomplish a 
given amount of work.  The resulting output is a 
determination of the number and types of positions 
needed to operate a given ship during wartime. 
(GAO, 1986, pp 11-12) 
Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) is assigned to 
develop and document total wartime manpower requirements for 
all fleet activities of the Navy. (CNO, 1990, pC-2)  Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYCOM) performs manpower 
personnel and training analysis for ships systems and 
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equipment designed for installations in Navy shore and ship 
activities. (Ibid, pC-3) NAVSEASYSCOM calculates the initial 
manpower requirements in the design and construction phase 
of the prototype ship of a given class.  After the initial 
ship has been commissioned tested, and evaluated; the ship 
and NAVMAC assess the utility of the preliminary manpower 
allotments.  They then report the findings and 
recommendations up the chain of command to the Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations (DCNO) for manpower, personnel, and 
training.  The SMD for the class is then finalized and 
future ships of the class are manned according to the 
finalized SMD.  Similar processes occur if any follow-on 
ships of the class receive different equipment or 
alterations. 
Ship manpower requirements are determined with respect 
to five key elements:  watch stations (ws), own unit support 
(ous), preventive maintenance (pm), corrective maintenance 
(cm), and facilities maintenance (fm).  The elements are 
defined as: 
•ws — essential positions to properly operate ship 
systems, subsystems and equipment (i.e., deck, 
engineering, weapons, and communications) 
•ous — administration, supply, food service, medical, 
utility, and special evolutions 
•pm — scheduled periodic "preventive" maintenance 
•cm — repair of damaged or deteriorating equipment 
•fm — cleaning and preserving all regions of the ship 
against corrosion and deterioration. 
The work load and the staffing standards for 
each of these areas varies according the condition 
of readiness the ship is to maintain.  The 
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conditions of readiness are condition I - battle 
readiness, condition II - battle readiness with 
limited action, condition III - wartime cruising 
readiness, condition IV - peacetime cruising 
readiness, and condition V - in-port readiness. 
Full manning at condition III (wartime cruising) 
is generally the most demanding because it calls 
for three shifts in order to staff each watch 
station needed to meet mission requirements 24 
hours a day.  Thus, at condition III, each watch 
station equates to three people.  (GAO pl3) 
B.  SHIP MANNING TRENDS 
The destroyer manning trends in the Navy are subtle but 
noticeable over a thirty year period, shown in Figures 3-1 
and 3-2.  In 1959 and 1960, the first guided missile 
destroyer class was commissioned (DDG 37 ex DLG 6.).  These 
ships were designed as multi-faceted platforms with AAW, 
ASW, and ASUW capability wrapped into one ship.  The ships 
had 431 men and officers assigned.  The DDG 2 class was 
built from 1959 to 1964 with a smaller hull design than the 
DDG-37 and had several differences in armament.  The class 
was composed of two flights essentially.  DDG 2-14 possessed 
the MK 11 missile launching system.  DDG 15-24 employed the 
MK 13 missile launchers.  The crew complement for DDG 2-14 
was 379 officers and men.  The later series required 391 
officers and men.  The DD 963 classes proliferated 
throughout the fleet from 1975 to 1983.  This class was 
significantly different from previous destroyers in design 
and engineering.  This was the first class of U.S. destroyer 
to employ marine gas turbine engines vice steam for main 
propulsion and power.  The DD 963 class received over the 
horizon (OTH) "strike" capability with the addition of the 
TOMAHAWK land attack missile (TLAM) and the TOMAHAWK anti- 
ship missile (TASM), a first for destroyers.  DD 963 class 
ships were also the first U.S. Navy destroyers designed to 
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house and operate light air-borne multipurpose system 
(LAMPS).  The DD's are now configured in two separate 
manners.  Seven of the SPRUANCE class launch Tomahawk 
missiles from armored box launchers (ABL) and twenty-four of 
the class possess the MK 41 vertical launching system (VLS) 
to launch either Tomahawk or ASROC.  The manning for the ABL 
configured ships consists of 367 enlisted and officer 
personnel.  The VLS ships require 373 officers and enlisted 
crew.  The DDG 993 class is configured similar to the DD 963 
except that it is geared for anti-air warfare (AAW) vice the 
"strike" role.  Crew complement for this class is 349 
combined enlisted and officer personnel.  In 1992 the first 
DDG 51 class ship was commissioned.  The DDG 51 has more 
fire-power, more displacement, and more steel than any other 
destroyer in the U.S. fleet.  Like the earlier DDG's, this 
class carries no helicopter, though it possesses a landing 
area.  DDG 51 employs the AEGIS air defense system and is 
also TLAM/TASM capable.  This class has the smallest 
complement of the five classes listed with 338 officers and 
enlisted personnel. 
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Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-1 Total Destroyer Manpower Requirement Trends 
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Enlisted and Officer Manning Trends 
II   I   I   II 
DDG 42 DDG 8 DDG 22 DD 976 DD 985 DDG 993 DDG 51 
Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-2 Enlisted and Officer Manning Trends 
C.  DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
To better understand the depth and breadth of the 
manpower requirement trends, one must understand the 
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function of ships of the United States Navy is either to 
fight or support combat operations.  If a ship is to 
function well in combat, the crew must be organized in a wa 
that it can be effectively directed and controlled.  The 
five basic departments found on all U.S. Navy ships are 
Navigation, Operations, Weapons or Combat Systems, 
Engineering, and Supply.  The ship's organization may 
include other departments to fulfill the its assigned tasks 
(Naval institute, pp 2,3)  This study will analyze the shipi 
by the following departments:  Executive, Navigation, 
Medical, Operations, Combat Systems/Weapons, Engineering, 
and Supply (FigUre 3-3).  The officers of a ship include the 
Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO), Department 
Heads, and Division Officers.  They are organized in a 
hierarchical fashion.  Most of the officers are unrestricted 
line officers.  This means that they are potentially 
eligible for command-at-sea.  Officer occupations are 
identified by designator.  The unrestricted line officers 
aboard destroyers are designated either 1110 if surface 
warfare qualified or 1160 if not surface warfare qualified. 
The remaining officers are either restricted line (not 
eligible for command-at-sea)(designator 1610), limited duty 
(designator 6000 series) or warr.nf nfr- ;
  
a
nt officers (designator 
7000 series.) The Medical and Supply officers are staff 
corps officers,  staff corps officers are specialized 
officers who are not eligible for command-at-sea.  Medical 
officers are designated 2100 and Supply officers are 
designated 3100.  Departmental organizational diagrams are 
listed in Figures 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, and 3-7.  The other (non- 
department head) officers are responsible for heading the 
divisions.  Divisions are usually composed of enlisted 
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personnel with similar occupations (ratings).  The enlisted 
ratings traditionally have been grouped according to 
specialized tasks that they perform.  The personnel operate 
and maintain certain equipment or perform specific tasks to 
fulfill a discreet aspect of the ship's mission. Enlisted 
occupations, or ratings are described in The Navy Enlisted 
Retention Manual.  The specific divisions are then 
subdivided into maintenance "work centers." 
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Figure 3-3 A Typical Destroyer Chain of Command. 
1.  Departmental Description 
For the purpose of this study, the departments are 
defined by mission and responsibilities. 
Executive Department:  responsible for the various 
administrative functions aboard a U.S. Navy Ship.  The 
department is normally composed of personnelmen (PN), yeomen 
(YN), master-at-arms (MA), navy counselor (NC), postal clerk 
(PC), a 3-M (maintenance, material, management) Coordinator 
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(can be almost any rating), the Command Master Chief (any 
rating.)  A line officer usually acts as the department head 
aboard destroyers. 
Navigation Department:  responsible for the safe 
navigation and ceremonial events of the ship.  The 
department consists of quartermasters (QM) and is headed by 
a line officer.  In the Atlantic fleet, the Executive 
Officer is designated as the Navigator aboard destroyer size 
vessels. 
Medical Department:  acts as the health care provider 
aboard destroyers.  The department is composed of hospital 
corpsmen (HM) and headed by a Medical Staff Officer (in 
wartime only). 
Operations Department:  responsible for the collection, 
evaluation, and dissemination of combat and operational 
information required for assigned missions (Figure 3-4). 
The department is also responsible for deck seamanship 
responsibilities if there is not a weapons department.  The 
department is staffed by operations specialists (OS), 
radiomen (RM), signalmen (SM), electronic warfare 
technicians (EW) [on most destroyers], electronic 
technicians (ET) and data systems technicians (DS)[if the 
ship has a weapons department], boatswain's mates (BM) [if 
the ship does not have a weapons department], seamen (SN), 
cryptologic technicians (CT varieties) [aboard DD 963 class 
only], and intelligence specialists (IS) [DD 963 class 
only].  The department is headed by a line officer and 
consists of several divisions.  The division officers may 
either be line, limited duty, warrant, or restricted line 
officers. 
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Figure 3-4 Typical Destroyer Operations Department, 
Combat Systems Department:  responsible for the 
direction of employing the units combat systems 
including ordinance.  Weapons Department would be 
responsible for employing the unit's weapon systems 
including ordinance and deck seamanship (Figure 3-5). 
The Combat Systems Department is composed of gunner's 
mates (guns and missiles)(GMG, GMM), fire controlmen 
(FC), electronic technicians (ET) and data systems 
technicians (DS)[not in Weapons Department], Sonar 
technicians (STG), torpedomen (TM), boatswain's mates 
(BM) [in weapons department], and seamen (SN).  The 
Combat Systems/Weapons Department head is a line officer 
and division officers are either line, limited duty, or 
warrant officers. 
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Figure 3-5 A Typical Destroyer Combat Systems or Weapons 
Department. 
Engineering Department:  responsible for propelling 
ship, allowing maneuverability, providing electrical 
power, air conditioning, damage control, stability, 
repairing and other mechanical and electrical services 
(Figure 3-6).  The department is composed of the 
following occupations:  boiler technicians (BT)[steam 
ships only], machinist mates (MM)[steam ships only], gas 
turbine technicians (mechanical and electrical) 
(GSM/GSE), enginemen (EN), electrician's mates (EM), 
interior communication electricians (IC), machinery 
repairmen (MR), damage controlmen (DC), and hull 
maintenance technicians (HT), and firemen (FN).  The 
department head is a line officer and is supported by 
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Figure 3-6 A Typical Destroyer Engineering Department, 
Supply Department:  responsible for logistical 
replenishment and management of parts, food, and money 
(Figure 3-7).  The department also provides retail services 
such as snack foods, hair cutting, and laundry.  The 
department is also responsible for preparing meals for the 
crew.  The department is staffed with the following 
personnel:  storekeeper (SK), mess management specialists 
(MS), ship's servicemen (SH), disbursing clerks (DK), seamen 
(SN), and firemen (FN).  The department is headed by a 
supply staff corps officer and assisted by one junior supply 
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A Typical Destroyer Supply Dep artmental Organization 
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Figure 3-7 A Typical Destroyer Supply Department. 
2.  Discussion 
In recent years the navy has come under scrutiny from 
several management analysts as having an outmoded and 
inefficient managerial (organizational) structure.  The 
ships' organizational structure appears outdated when 
compared to the evolution that has occurred in private 
industry. (Lovelace, pl5)  Unfortunately, destroyers cannot 
be instantly compared to merchant ships of similar 
displacement.  Their missions are drastically different. 
The crew size and composition are similar only in deck watch 
standing, engineering watch standing, cargo handling, and 
food preparation.  Merchant ships, as a rule, do not fire 
weapons, search for airplanes or submarines, launch 
helicopters, or send and receive radio and visual messages 
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women to sail and operate these warships.  Civilians hire 
mostly experienced and licensed mariners to move cargo from 
point to point.  The relatively high personnel numbers can 
be partially attributed to hiring young persons (18 to 22 
years old) and training them aboard ship.  If destroyers 
were composed of only fully trained and experienced 
personnel, then some manpower requirements would drop 
significantly.  Another organizational constraint is the 
requirement for a career counselor and numerous clerical 
workers.  Personal computers have made clerical workers less 
valuable than before.  Black box technology has become the 
normal technical advancement aboard modern ships since the 
development of the DD 963 class and later ships. As 
electronic components replace mechanical components, the 
trends will show smaller personnel requirements in affected 
occupations.  The final real constraint that keeps personnel 
numbers high aboard destroyers is the Navy ROC/POE 
statement.  If the ROC/POE listed 30 to 45 days continuously 
underway in wartime steaming vice 60 days, then crew size 
could theoretically be reduced.  Unfortunately, the 
resulting crew reduction would also yield reduction in 
combat effectiveness.  The author does not see reducing 
combat effectiveness as an advantageous solution to rising 
personnel costs. 
Currently information technology may be waiting to 
change to change the destroyer workplace to yield reductions 
in personnel. Unfortunately, the destroyer would have to be 
built with the substitution in mind prior to development. 
The navy has benefited from initial planning developments in 
the case of the DD 963 class destroyers in comparison to the 
elder DDG 37 and DDG 2 class ships.  Computers were an 
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important aspect in developing the DD 963 and DDG 993 ships. 
The classes feature NTDS, SNAP II (a logistical computer 
system), SQQ 89 (in some ships) [a digital data link for ASW 
which coordinates, the ship's sonar, TACTAS, and the 
helicopter's information to compile a unified underwater 
"picture"], and a "somewhat" automated engineering plant. 
Computers also play an important role in the development of 
the DDG 51 class with a bit more sophistication than earlier 
classes.  The AEGIS tactical defense system combined with 
NTDS and local area network (LAN) technology were the 
highest profile computer advances that have been employed. 
These advances vastly improved tactical and non-tactical 
information management.  Unfortunately, the BURKE's were 
designed and configured immediately prior to the vast 
productivity improvements in industry.  The next logical 
step in this evolution to design a ship that better exploits 
the capabilities of computers vice using computers to 
replicate human effort.  This topic will be expanded in 
chapter four.  With this background, we can now observe the 
manning trends over the past thirty years of destroyer 
development and make generalizations. 
D.  DEPARTMENTAL MANNING TRENDS 
1.  Executive Department 
The Executive Department manning trends show slight 
fluctuations in requirements over the classes from fourteen 
persons to eleven (Figure 3-8).  This variation can be 
explained by DDG 22 having two uncommon requirements unique 
in this sample of destroyers.  None of the other ships have 
a requirement for either an IC or a JO.  Ships in the sample 
commissioned after 1978 (except DDG 51) each have a 
compliment of six YN's.  The others have a requirement of 
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five YN's.  DDG 42, DD 976, and DD 985 have all YN 
requirements grouped in the Executive Department because the 
respective SMD's listed and grouped requirements by rating 
rather than department and division. The author grouped the 
YN requirements in the Executive Department for accounting 
convenience.  DDG 8, 22, 993, & 51 have three YN 
requirements in the department.  The other YN requirements 
are dispersed to either two or three of the operational 
departments (Operations, Weapons/Combat Systems, or 
Engineering.)  If all of YN requirements are similar and DDG 
22 has no unusual configuration, then all of the ships in 
the sample who have eleven personnel in the department. 
Unless the standards for ous are higher for the ships 
commissioned on the SPRUANCE hull (DD 976, DD 985, DDG 993), 
there is no current explanation for the additional YN aboard 
these platforms.  DDG 8 and DDG 22 do not have a YN 
requirement in the Operations Department.  DDG 51 does not 
have a YN requirement in the Combat Systems Department. 
These ships have one MA, one NC, one PC, two PO's (E-8 and 
E-9 of any rating), three PN's.  The main impetus for 
Executive Department manning is ous. 
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Figure 3-8 Executive Department Manning Trends 
2.  Navigation Department 
The Navigation department manning trends do not vary- 
throughout the sample (Figure 3-9).  Each ship has a 
requirement for one E-6, one E-5, two E-4, and one E-3 in 
the QM rating.  Theoretically, the most significant factors 
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3. Medical Department 
The Medical department manning trend, like the 
Navigation Department, show no variance throughout the 
sample (Figure 3-9).  Each ship requires two HM's, one E-7 
and one E-4.  Ous is the key determinant for manning this 
department. 
4. Operations Department 
The Operations Department manning trends vary 
throughout the sample (Figure 3-10) . Most of the variance 
can be attributed to a departmental reorganization that 
shifted Electronics "away from" and Deck Division "to" the 
Operations Department aboard those ships who transitioned 
the Weapons Department to a Combat Systems Department (DD 
976 and later ships.)  DD 976 and DD 985 have an 
additionally larger department because they are configured 
with OUTBOARD and 17 personnel (16 CT and 1 IS) in support. 
A "1610" designated restricted line officer (cryptology) 
serves as the OUTBOARD Division Officer.  Also, DDG 993 has 
its Electronic Warfare Division in the Combat Systems 
Department.  The Departmental trends can be explained by 
analyzing the individual ratings.  The ratings grouped 
together form the divisions, which as whole comprise the 
department.  RM's differ from platform to platform and 
currently show an increasing trend.  OS numbers differ 
across platforms as well however they currently are showing 
a downward trend.  The ships show no variance in SM CT, and 
IS ratings.  The number of BM's and SN should in theory 
depend on the area of topside space per platform.  Ws is the 
primary driver for the Operations Department manpower 
requirements other than Deck Division.  Fm requirements 
dictate BM and SN manpower requirements. 
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Figure 3-10 Operations Department Manning Trends 
5.  Weapons/Combat Systems Department 
The trends across the samples show numerical decreases 
in some ratings and increases in others (Figure 3-11). 
Another big shift is in the type of rating.  The manual 
"unskilled" labor has been shifted over to the Operations 
Department (BM and SN ratings) in the later ships (with a 
Combat Systems Department).  Deck Division was replaced with 
two varieties of Electronic Technician ratings (ET and DS) . 
DDG 51 has no DS requirement because the ET and FC ratings 
have acquired the background training on systems to take 
over maintenance, which yielded a net reduction in overall 
personnel requirements.  The Gunnery Divisions (GMG and FC) 
have seen personnel decreases as guns have become fully 
automated.  This also greatly reduced the need for 
additional ammunition handlers (which came from Deck 
Division).  The Missile Division (GMM and FC) trends have 
decreased somewhat over the years until DDG 51. The ASW 
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the years. This is largely a result of removal of a GMM 
requirement, as a result of alternative ASROC launch 
configurations in DD 985, DDG 993, and DDG 51 compared to 
the "pepper box" ASROC launchers on the other ships. 
Weapons Department manning requirements are driven mainly by 
fm, pm, and cm.  Combat Systems Department manning is 
determined more by pm, cm, and ws. 
Combat Systems/Weapons Department Manning Trends 
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Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-11 Combat Systems/Weapons Department Manning 
Trends. 
6.  Engineering Department 
The most significant personnel reductions aboard 
destroyers have been realized in the Engineering Department 
as a result of transitions from steam to gas turbine 
propulsion (Figure 3-12).  The main propulsion divisions 
have seen drastic reductions in the number of personnel and 
the elimination of one division (B Division [BT & FN] and M 
Divisions [MM & FN] into MP Division [GSE, GSM, & FN]).  At 
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the same time, Auxiliary Division branched into two separate 
divisions A/E Division (EM, IC, EN, MM, MR, & FN) to A 
Division (EN, MR, & FN) and E Division.(EM & IC).  Repair 
Division (DC, HT, & FN) has seen fairly consistent numbers. 
The department as a whole has been cut in half as a result 
of employing gas turbine and other solid state technology. 
Engineering Department Manning Trends 
DDG42 DDG8 DDG22        DD 976        DD985       DDG993 
Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
DDG51 
Figure 3-12 Engineering Department Manning Trends. 
7. Supply Department 
The Supply Department has also seen reductions in 
manpower requirements over the years (Figure 3-13) .  The 
largest reductions in personnel have come from the S-2 
Division (food service) (MS, SN, & FN).  The S-3 Division 
(ship's service) (SH & SN) has seen slight increases over 
time.  The S-l (Stock Control) (SK & SN) and S-4 
(Disbursing) (DK) Divisions have shown steady trends. 
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Figure 3-13 Supply Department Manning Trends 
E.   DISCREET RATING TRENDS AMONG THE FOUR MAJOR DEPARTMENTS 
(OPERATIONS, WEAPONS/COMBAT SYSTEMS, ENGINEERING, 
SUPPLY) 
1.  Boatswain's Mate (BM) (Weapons, Operations) 
Actual BM requirements have shown a downward trend 
aboard destroyers (Figure 3-14) .  Without the actual 
manpower requirement calculations, one must assume that 
improvements in topside preservation equipment, automation 
of gun mounts, and small boat improvements have played a 
significant factor in allowing the reduction of 16 BM 
personnel requirements aboard DDG 42 to 11 aboard DDG 993 & 
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Figure 3-14 Boatswain Mate Rating Trends. 
2.  Boiler Technician (BT) (Engineering) 
BT requirements show a decreasing trend in the steam 
ships (Figure 3-15).  There are no requirements for BT's 
aboard the gas turbine ships.  This fact has helped decrease 
the Engineering Department manning.  Ws and pm probably 
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Figure 3-15 Main Propulsion Rating Trends. 
3.  Damage Controlman (DC) (Engineering) 
DC manpower trends appear related to the displacement 
of the respective ship (Figure 3-16).  The one exception to 
this observation is DDG 22 that has no DC requirements 
listed on its SMD (HT's fill the requirements).  DDG 42 & 8 
have eight DC requirements while DD 976, 985, & DDG 993 have 
ten requirements.  DDG 51 has a requirement for nine DC 
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Figure 3-16 Damage Controlman Rating Trends, 
4.  Data Systems Technician (DS) (Operations, Combat 
Systems) 
The DS rating was initially established aboard DDG 42 
to maintain the NTDS (Figure 3-17).  DDG 42 has eight DS 
requirements.  DDG 8 was configured without NTDS and there 
fore has no DS requirements.  DDG 22 received NTDS later in 
life and has five DS requirements.  DD 976 & 985 each have 
seven DS requirements while DDG 993 has eight personnel 
requirements.  DDG 51 has no DS requirements because the FC 
rating has absorbed the AEGIS and NTDS computer maintenance 
requirements and the ET rating performs maintenance on the 
non tactical computer systems.  In the future, this rating 
will probably merge with those two ratings.  Pm and cm 
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Source: Ship»' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-17 Data Systems and Electronic Technician Rating 
Trends. 
5.  Electrician's Mate (EM) (Engineering) 
EM's have seen decreasing requirements through the 
years (Figure 3-18).  The steam ships (DDG 42, 8, & 22) 
required eleven EM personnel each.  The requirements aboard 
DD 976 & 985 are six EM's, while DDG 993 & 51 require only 
five personnel.  In the gas turbine ships, EM's have been 
substituted with GSE's to maintain and repair electrical 
systems in the main propulsion and auxiliary engineering 
spaces, which accounts for the reduced EM requirements. 
Aboard the steam ships ws, pm, and cm drove manning 
requirements, while the gas turbine manning is pushed only 
by pm and cm. 
56 
t  yst s  l ctronic echnici  ti  
r nds 
14 r--------------------.'mET I 














O  O  
 
: i s' i  t  
i r   at  s s  l ct i  echnici  ati  
r ds. 
. lectri i ' at ) gi eeri )
's r e ent o
r r - 8). ea i D , ,  )
i el . e ent r
 's, hil  i l
r nel. i s, 's
sti it SE's aint i i t l
e ai l il i r
es, hi t i ents.
boar team s, , anni
ents, hil anni l
 .
Electrician's Mate Trends 
Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-18 Electrician's Mate Rating Trends, 
6.  Engineman (EN) (Engineering) 
EN requirements have increased dramatically through the 
years, but is now showing declining requirements (Figure 3- 
19).  This occurred as a result of removing the MM rating 
from gas turbine ships.  The steam ships rate two EN 
personnel. Aboard those ships, the EN's only performed 
maintenance on the emergency diesel generator engines and 
the ships' small boats. Aboard the DD's, the EN 
responsibilities expanded to all non-electric components of 
auxiliary equipment.  EN's also have the responsibility of 
maintaining the aviation fuel system for the helicopters. 
This expanded the EN requirements to thirteen.  DDG 993 was 
the first destroyer to employ low maintenance rigid hull 
inflatable boats (RHIB) in place of the old fashioned labor 
intensive traditional "motor whale boats." DDG 993 has 
twelve EN requirements.  DDG 51 has only seven requirements 
that could be related to no helo service capability.  Pm and 
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Figure 3-19 Engineman Rating Trends. 
7. Electronic Technician (ET) (Operations, Combat 
Systems) 
ET manning requirements display an interesting cyclic 
trend (Figure 3-17). DDG 42, DD 976 & 985 each have twelve 
ET requirements while DDG 993 has thirteen requirements. 
DDG 8, 22, & 51 have eleven requirements. The difference in 
requirements may be a result of the total number of radars 
and radio equipment to maintain and repair. Pm and cm are 
major determinants of ET manning. 
8. Electronic Warfare Technician (EW) (Operations, 
Combat Systems) 
EWs have hovered between six and seven requirements 
for all seven ships (Figure 3-20).  Though all seven ships 
received SLQ-32(V2), the DD 976, 985, DDG 51 may have 
received the "side-kick" modification that has a "jamming" 
feature.  These ships have seven EW requirements while DDG 
42, 8, 22, & 993 have six requirements.  The jamming feature 
probably has extra maintenance tasks.  Ws, pm, and cm should 
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Figure 3-20 Electronic Warfare Technician Rating Trends 
9.  Fire Controlman (FC) (Weapons, Combat Systems) 
FC's have been segregated by specialties in either 
gunnery or missiles.  The gun FC's show a mixed trend from 
DDG 42 to DDG 51 (Figure 3-21).  Part of the trend can be 
attributed to advancements in gunfire control systems aboard 
the, SPRUANCE class platforms and later.  Part of the 
increase can be attributed to the addition CIWS to later 
platforms.  The reduction of gun FC's aboard DDG 51 is due 
to the removal of the aft 5"54 gun. Missile FC's have also 
shown a mixed pattern.  The most interesting note is that DD 
97 6, DD 985, and DDG 993 have the same number of manpower 
requirements yet their capabilities are vastly different. 
DD 97 6 possesses eight TLAM/TSAM (ABL) and NATO SEASPARROW 
(BPDMS). DD 985 has TLAM/TASM from the 61 cell MK 41 VLS and 
NATO SEASPARROW (BPDMS) and DDG 993 possesses 2 MK 26 
Standard AAW missile launchers.  The DDG 51 missile FC's 
also perform maintenance on the AEGIS system that explains 
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Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-21 Fire Control Technician Rating Trends, 
10.  Gunner's Mate (Guns) (GMG) (Weapons, Combat 
Systems) 
GMG's have seen decreases in personnel requirements as 
gunnery systems have become more automated and the number of 
gun mounts have decreased (Figure 3-22) . An interesting 
note is how DDG 8 & 22 have the same number and type of guns 
and gun fire control system, yet they have different 
requirements for GMG's.  The same holds true for DD 976 
compared to DD 985 and DDG 993.  DDG 42 & 51 possess only 
one 5 inch 54 caliber gun.  The other ships have two 5 inch 
54 caliber guns.  The SPRUANCE class and later ships have 
fully unmanned gun mounts.  DDG 22 has the high requirement 
for GMG's with 10 and DDG 51 has the smallest requirement 
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with 6.  DDG 42, 8 and DD 976 have 8 requirements, while DD 
985 and DDG 993 have 9 requirements. 
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Figure 3-22 Gunner's Mate (Guns) Rating Trends, 
11.  Gunner's Mate (Missiles) (GMM) (Weapons, Combat 
Systems) 
GMM manning appears to be related to the number of 
missiles and the age of launch systems (Figure 3-23).  The 
older AAW DDG's have requirements ranging from 10 to 15 
GMM's while DDG 993 requires 9 GMM's, have twice as many 
launchers, and almost fifty percent greater missile 
capacity.  DD 976 has the smallest and least potent missile 
capacity and the smallest requirement for GMM's.  The GMM 
manning requirement aboard the VLS ships (DD 985 and DDG 51) 
seems to be related to the total number of missiles (61-90.) 
DD 985 has seven requirements and DDG 51 has eight 
requirements for GMM. 
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Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-23 Gunner's Mate (Missiles) Rating Trends, 
12. Gas Turbine Serviceman (Electrical & Mechanical) 
(GSE & GSM) (Engineering) 
GSE and GSM requirements have remained constant 
throughout the gas turbine configured destroyers at eight 
and twenty respectively (Figure 3-15).  GSE's absorbed the 
responsibility of maintenance on electric power generate and 
main engineering space electrical distribution systems, 
which led to a reduction in EM manpower requirements.  GSM's 
have replaced the BT and MM (main propulsion) occupation 
with the evolution of steam engines to gas turbine engines. 
Pm and ws are the primary drivers for GSE and GSM manning. 
13. Hull Maintenance Technician (HT) (Engineering) 
HT trends have see sawed up and down over the years 
(Figure 3-24).  DDG 22 has the highest requirement for HT 
because there are no DC requirements on that ship.  HT 
requirements vary from 4 on DDG 42, 8, & 51 to 5 aboard DD 
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and fm are the primary tasks that push HT requirements 
except for DDG 22 (pm, cm, and fm). 
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Figure 3-24 Hull Maintenance Technician Rating Trends 
14.  Interior Communications Electrician (IC) 
(Engineering) 
IC manning requirements vary from six aboard DDG 42, 8, 
22, & 51 to five aboard DD 976, 985, and DDG 993 (Figure 3- 
25).  Pm and cm push the requirements for IC manning. Though 
the type of equipment has evolved from analog to digital in 
many instances, the maintenance and manpower requirements 
have not waned. 
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Sourc«: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-25 Internal Communications Electrician Rating 
Trends. 
15. Machinist Mate (MM) (Engineering) 
MM requirements were actually increasing prior to the 
extinction of the steam destroyers (Figure 3-15).  DDG 42 & 
8 had thirty-nine total MM's while DDG 22 has forty total 
requirements. All these ships have thirty-four requirements 
in main propulsion.  DDG 42 & 8 have five requirements in 
auxiliary while DDG 22 has six requirements in auxiliary 
division.  Ws, pm, and cm mandate MM manning. 
16. Mess Management Specialist (MS) (Supply) 
MS manning has vary from a high of nineteen 
requirements aboard DDG 22 to a low of fourteen requirements 
aboard DD 976, 985, and DDG 993 (Figure 3-26).  DDG 42 & 8 
have seventeen MS requirements while DDG 51 requires sixteen 
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Source: Ship*' Manning Document« 
Figure 3-2 6 Mess Management Specialist Rating Trends 
17.  Operations Specialist (OS) (Operations) 
OS requirements vary according to the number of radar 
repeaters and tactical data consoles aboard destroyers 
(Figure 3-27). Manning varies from a high of thirty-seven 
aboard DDG 993 to a low of twenty-five aboard DDG 8.  DDG 42 
has thirty-four while DDG 22, DD 976 & 985 have thirty-one 
requirements.  DDG 51 has only twenty-eight requirements. 
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Figure 3-27 Operations Specialist Rating Trends, 
18.  Radioman (RM) (Operations) 
RM requirements fluctuate from a high of twenty aboard 
DDG 42 to a low of thirteen aboard DDG 8, 22, & 993 (Figure 
3-28). DD 976 & 985 have sixteen RM requirements. DDG 51 
has nineteen requirements. Ws requirements, which drive RM 
manning, are determined by the number of personnel operated 
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Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-28 Radioman Rating Trends. 
19.  Sonar Technician (STG) (Weapons and Combat 
Systems) 
STG manning requirements are sixteen personnel aboard 
DDG 42, 8, & 22, which have the PAIR sonar (Figure 3-29). 
DD 976 & 985 have SQS-53C and SQR-19 TACTAS and require 
twenty STG's.  DDG 993 has the SQS-53C but no TACTAS and 
requires only fourteen STG's.  DDG 51 has the SQS-53C and 
TACTAS and requires nineteen personnel.  Ws, pm, and cm 
dictate STG manning requirements. 
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Figure 3-29 Sonar Technician Rating Trends 
20.  Ship's Serviceman (SH) (Supply) 
SH manning hovers from six to seven across the sample 
(Figure 3-30).  DDG 42,8, 22. & 993 each require six SH's, 
while seven are required aboard DD 976, 985 and DDG 51.  Ous 
enforces the SH requirement aboard destroyers. 
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Figure 3-30 Ship's Serviceman Rating Trends, 
21.  Storekeeper (SK) (Supply) 
SK' s also perform ous and as a rule have a requirement 
for eight personnel.  Only DDG 22 has a requirement for nine 
SK's (Figure 3-31). 


























Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
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22.  Fireman (FN) (Engineering and Supply) 
FN have a declining requirement trend through the years 
(Figure 3-32) .  DDG 42 has the most FN requirements with 
twenty-nine.  DDG 8 & 22 have twenty-three and twenty-eight 
requirements respectively.  Steam ships have a higher FN 
requirement than the gas turbine ships.  DD 976, 985 and DDG 
993 have fifteen requirements while DDG 51 has only thirteen 






Non-Rated Fireman Trends 
Source: Ships' Manning Documents 
Figure 3-32 Non-Rated Fireman Rating Trends. 
23.  Seaman (SN) (Operations, Weapons, and Supply) 
SN manning appears to be related (much like BM manning) 
to topside area (Figure 3-33).  DD 985 has the largest SN 
requirement with forty-two.  DDG 42, & 993 require forty-one 
SN.  DD 976 requires thirty-nine, while DDG 51 is manned 
with thirty-five.  DDG 8 & 22 have the smallest requirements 
with thirty-one SN.  SN manning is dictated by fm and ous 
requirements. 
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Figure 3-33 Non-Rated Seaman Rating Trends 
F.  MANPOWER COSTS 
This study employs the Navy Manpower Billet Cost Factor 
cost estimation model to determine overall personnel costs 
for the different platforms in the sample.  The Navy Billet 
Cost Factor (BCF) is a computerized personnel cost model 
compiled and developed by the SAG Corporation for the U.S. 
Navy Bureau of Personnel "to enable defense contractors to 
accurately and consistently estimate the manpower costs of 
weapon systems." 
•Military compensation (consists of basic pay, Basic 
Allowance for Quarters (BAQ), Basic Allowance for 
Subsistence (BAS), and Variable Housing Allowance 
(VHA)) 
•Retired pay accrual. 
•Training costs (include initial training, 
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•Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) (paid on a 
discretionary basis to individuals of certain rates or 
skills) 
•Enlisted recruiting (amortized Navy resources 
necessary to attract or recruit over the career of an 
individual that includes recruiters and enlistment 
bonuses, advertising, and processing). 
•Medical support (covers fixed and variable non-pay 
costs that provide healthcare to members and family). 
•Other benefits (include death gratuities, apprehension 
of deserter award, unemployment compensation to ex- 
service members, adoption expenses, clothing, Morale, 
Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) benefits, and government 
contribution to social security tax). 
•Permanent Change of Station (PCS) (covers rotational, 
operational, accession, training and separation moves). 
•Officer acquisition (includes advertising, 
scholarships, initial training, military pay, 
allowances, instructor costs, operation, and support 
costs). 
•GI Bill (estimates the present value of basic GI Bill 
benefits at time of enlistment).  This is funded by the 
Veterans Administration vice the DoD. 
•Separation costs (accrued leave benefits, severance or 
disability pay, and a separation move). (BCF Operations 
Manual) 
1.  BCF Sources 
All data for military compensation is extracted from 
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) pay tables, allowance 
tables, or RMC/BMC tables except VHA.  VHA data is obtained 
from a Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) calculation of 
average VHA by rating and paygrade as of the end of FY 1993. 
(Ibid., pll)  The retired pay accrual is determined by 
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multiplying the basic pay by fixed normal cost percentage 
obtained from the DoD actuary. (Ibid., pl3)  SRB amounts 
were provided by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS). 
(Ibid., pl4)  All training cost data were provided by the 
Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET). (Ibid., pl6) 
Navy Recruiting Command provided all recruiting costs. 
(Ibid., pl9)  Medical support costs were extracted from the 
Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System from the 
Navy's Bureau of Medicine. (Ibid., p21)  The "other 
benefits" data are found in MPN and OMN budget justification 
books. (Ibid., p23)  PCS data are obtained from the MPN 
justification book and current Joint Travel Regulations. 
(Ibid., p28)   Officer acquisition data were extracted from 
the U.S. Naval Academy and the Resource Manager of Officer 
Accessions at CNET.  (Ibid., p31)  G.I. Bill data compute 
the expected net government outlays associated with the 
basic benefit. (Ibid., p32)  Separation costs come from the 
MPN Budget Justification Book. VSI, SSB, and 15 year 
retirement programs were not included in these Figures. 
(Ibid., p34) 
This cost estimation method provides many factors vital 
in assessing manpower costs for ships and other weapon 
platforms.  It should be noted the weakest elements in this 
cost data base are the officer accession and training cost 
elements.  Another shortfall of the model is the lack of 
cost assessment for the Chief Warrant Officer ranks (CWO). 
For the purpose of this study, CWO costs will be assessed 
utilizing the LDO Ensign (0-1) costs.  By nature of 
occupation, experience, accession path, and training; CWO's 
more closely resemble LDO's than any other officer or 
enlisted personnel.  One final note concerning a potential 
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problem with the BCF data base is in the Operations Manual 
concerning separation costs.  It appeared to the author that 
separation moves were listed in both the PCS module and the 
Separation Cost module.  If this is so, then the BCF will 
add separation moves twice for each individual and thus 
provide an artificially high cost estimate for the 
individual analyzed.  The author contacted the SAG 
Corporation to discuss this apparent discrepancy with the 
BCF developers.  The SAG spokesman stated he would research 
the issue and update the Operations Manual.  SAG estimated 
that the BCF only added the cost of a separation move once 
and that the Operations Manual had not been revised to 
reflect. (Mairs, 1995) 
2.  Cost Trends 
The data reveal declining overall costs through the 
sample.  Interestingly, the costs of the crews do not 
decline in proportion to crew reduction (Figure 3-34).  This 
phenomenon can be analyzed by observing the similarities and 
differences in enlisted and officer manning requirements 
(both rating/designator and rank).  The enlisted costs in 
this data are most influenced by training, officer 
acquisition, and recruiting costs that account for unusual 
costs in various ratings.  In this case, the unusual being 
E-4 costs (in certain ratings) exceeding E-5 and E-6 costs. 
The same holds true in the officer ranks with 0-3 costs 
exceeding that of 0-4 and 0-5.  DDG 42 has the highest total 
costs of enlisted and of officer personnel with 
$19,879,378.04 and $2,582,806.58 respectively.  DDG 51 has 
the lowest overall enlisted costs of $15,749,139.29.  DDG 
993 has the lowest officer costs in the sample with 
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$1,956,236.99.  These costs cannot single-handedly be 
attributed to personnel reduction.  The total numbers of 
combined enlisted and officer requirements have declined 
through the past thirty years.' The total combined manpower 
costs of ships commissioned from 1960 through 1991 have 
declined from a total of $22,462,184.62 for DDG 42 to a low 
of $18,047,338.01 on DDG 993.  DDG 51 had very high officer 
costs that made it more expensive than DDG 993 in terms of 
total combined manpower costs.  The manning cost reductions 
over the sample appear related to the differences in costs 
through the various departments and required officer 
designators and ranks.  These requirements are a result of 













Total Manpower Cost Tmnds in FY93 DoHara 
- ■•■ . . ^fc&W;-',, Q'J'-l'.?;**:;--;$ 
m ....;:*.■...._..      ■.     ... ".",•*;"'' : *";Ä'V5^Pn'-; 
I^I^V~         fl 
^B.  •    v-««_    .-.■r--<^^m- ■• 
A- '■' *?. ** ■M . .' 
T' 1             ':-„        ■ 
»Ü L^LI. ^H~"7^x •',: 
1—ÜH ■   ' *■ ■<*. ^H   ; '"-*i 1" ~ •*• 
~ H        ~-i  fl LH   ^" 1 '.; H-r B-.;*% 1 ~ 1 ^M  *■* ■^■^■L___*i_ 
— 
•-;v J —r- B—1 















Sourc« Strip*' MwHUno OocumM» and Navy BNfcrt Coat fatter 
Figure 3-34 Total Manpower Cost Trends. 
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A closer look at the Figures show that some departments 
have seen reductions in costs, some have remained the same, 
while others have seen increases over time (Figure 3-35) . 
The Navigation and Medical Departments have seen constant 
personnel requirements and costs using FY93 costs as a base. 
The Executive Department has shown slight ups and downs in 
personnel and costs over the years.  The Operations 
Department has shown a some increase over time depending on 
how the department is organized. Adding deck division raises 
the costs.  Outboard capable ships (DD's) have even higher 
costs.  Weapons departments are more costly than Combat 
Systems Departments (as a result of deck division).  Both 
show a decreasing cost trend which can be partially 
attributed to personnel reduction.  Also showing vast 
personnel numbers reductions, Engineering Departments have 
seen the greatest cost reductions over.  This is directly 
attributable to the transition from steam to gas turbine 
systems.  Supply departments have shown small decreases over 
time.  The departmental costs are dependent on the 
respective divisional costs and the respective ratings and 
ranks of requirements that compose them. 
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IV.  THE AUTONOMIC SHIP 
This chapter will discuss broad technical possibilities 
of the next generation U.S. Navy destroyer.  For the purpose 
of this study, SC 21 will serve as an abbreviation for the 
next generation destroyer.  Concepts for the SC 21 were 
first formulated by the Navy in 1988.  This study, entitled 
Ship Operational Characteristics Study (SOCS), analyzed and 
debated the various desired features to meet the anticipated 
needs of the next generation destroyer.  In 1993, the Naval 
Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Bethesda, MD 
(NSWC) presented a proposed concept of the next generation 
destroyer to meet the Navy's twenty first century 
commitments.  NSWC aspired to "synergize" unified warfare 
and united support systems (hull, mechanical, electrical and 
logistical) using high performance distributed computing 
networks to introduce the Autonomie Ship. Autonomie is a 
term coined from medical terminology that describes the 
involuntary nervous system.  The objective of this warship 
concept is to optimize the "man to machinery" mix.  This 
optimal mix should offset higher capital investments and 
yield great personnel cost savings.  NSWC sees new computer 
technology interfacing with improved mechanical, electrical, 
and robotics technology to make the Autonomie Ship a 
possible and plausible candidate as SC 21.  RADM David 
Sargent, Commander of the Naval Surface Warfare Center made 
a comment adding that the "twenty first century combatant 
will most likely be built on a DDG 51 hull."  (Sargent, 
1994)  Autonomie technology should allow reductions in 
manpower and increases in weapon system capabilities in 
future classes.  The resultant goal is a class of less 
manpower intensive and more capable weapon platforms to put 
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"ordinance on target." The major Autonomie Ship highlights 
with respect to manpower requirements will be discussed in 
this chapter.  The following subject areas were described: 
the computer backbone, ship control, machinery control, 
damage control, maintenance, warfare, logistics, 
administration, communications, and training. 
A.  COMPUTER BACKBONE 
The Autonomie Ship will employ coordinated concepts 
such as ubiquitous computing systems (computers everywhere), 
fault tolerant systems, and software objects.  When these 
qualities are combined into a huge system, they will provide 
tasking and function analysis.  Hypothesized interfaces for 
the computers include voice, pen, virtual reality, desk top 
consoles, etc.  The planners anticipate an unmanned 
universal operating system more advanced than current "open 
standard" systems that utilizes object libraries linked by 
intelligent agents in place of existing third and fourth 
generation digital language systems.  Software advances are 
projected to be an extension of current object oriented 
setups (for example, MS Windows) using agents vice objects. 
Current object oriented software employs the following 
protocol to execute desired functions:  interface, 
algorithm, and data structures.  The agent oriented system 
will make use of the process as object oriented software 
except that that the agent oriented software will employ a 
context filter to allow greater flexibility and interface 
possibilities. (NSWC, 1993)  Hardware emphasis in the 
ubiquitous computing concept involves numerous computer 
nodes throughout the ship with many processors to provide 
enough capacity and redundancy to keep the entire system 
"effectively invulnerable to battle damage." (NSWC, 1993) 
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The computing backbone will provide the vast majority 
of decision making and minor execution in the areas of the 
ship.  Through coordination with sensors and effectors, the 
computing backbone can store, process, interpret, and 
display real-time filtered information as opposed to raw 
data.  The planners emphasized a desire for fault tolerant 
yet reconfigurable computers.  The systems must ensure 
computing, redundant storage and retrieval capabilities. 
Other planned features include ergonomic consoles, high 
definition television, direct interactive controls, 3-d 
volumetric displays, virtual reality, and personal access 
display devices (PADD) (for example, Apple Newton, and AT&T 
Personal Communicator). (NSWC, 1993) 
B.  SHIP CONTROL 
The Autonomie Ship is expected to employ a command 
Center that combines the Bridge and CIC in an enclosed, 
centralized, and protected area.  The designers ideally 
desire 360 degree view screens to allow vision of the 
environment as if being outside the ship.  Television, low 
light television, infrared, radar and imaging sonar can be 
developed to make this a reality.  Navigation can be 
provided using improvements in the already existing global 
positioning system, inertial navigation system, and visual 
fixes.  The navigational systems can be interfaced with 
future weapon systems for targeting information. (NSWC, 
1993)  The media inputs can be simultaneously placed on 
electronic charts.  The charts can also be updated 
electronically via external communication devices. 
Additional technical additions include an "enhanced auto- 
pilot" that will be linked to the self defense and 
navigation systems.  Ideally, the auto-pilot will be able to 
puti ill i st ajorit
i aki i r t
i . r r i t it r t rs,
puti , ess, ret,
tim ltere at a
t . r phasi si lt t
t f r l puters. e ust r
puti g, t e l abiliti s.
t er g i soles,
fi i o , i t ntr ls,
l etri i l s, i l li , r al
i PA ) ple, ppl e ton,
r al o municator). N , )
. I
ut ic i t pl a
enter t bi es ri l ,
tr l , t . r l
si r e lo i
on ent t i . el visi , o
t , , r i r
a li . avigati
r ents ea i l
si o , rti l i t , i l
. i ati al e fa it
e e n ati . N ,
) edi t l sl
i arts. art at
i l i t l municati i es.
dditi al i l it t -
i t t ill ink l
i t s. all , t - il t ill l
81 
"flinch." The auto-pilot will feature various modes such as 
patrol, piloting, and a coordinated zigzag.  The auto-pilot 
will be able to perform underway replenishment piloting 
while alongside other ships by employing laser range finders 
and a data link to provide safe ship handling actions. 
(NSWC, 1993)  Current technology exists to far surpass the 
IBS navigational suite tested aboard USS MCCANDLESS that 
would have yielded an approximately fifty percent reduction 
in bridge manning under most circumstances. 
C.  MACHINERY CONTROL 
The Autonomie Ship will feature a Central Control 
Station (also a Command Center) as the propulsion plant and 
auxiliary machinery monitoring station.  The new features 
anticipated by the concept team are machinery control from 
any device and tele-presence of all machinery spaces. (NSWC, 
1993) Robotics technology will make this idea feasible.  In 
addition to monitoring, the robots may perform mundane 
maintenance, operations, and initial casualty or damage 
control actions.  The computer backbone is projected to 
provide monitoring analytical capacity of propulsion, power 
generation and auxiliary equipment.  This capacity will 
allow unmanned engineering spaces and remote configuring of 
auxiliary systems.  The Autonomie ship brief did not 
introduce any new methods of propulsion or power generation. 
The computer backbone will provide decision aids to help 
determine optimal operation of equipment.  Designers project 
the systems will perform "smart paralleling" and damage or 
failure recovery.  This will lengthen equipment operating 
time and capabilities. 
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D.  MAINTENANCE 
Designers stress moving away from time based 
maintenance, stressing condition-based maintenance instead. 
The computer system is foreseen to have software that can 
provide on-line machinery condition assessment.  The 
maintenance software programs could predict time to failure 
and allow maintenance personnel to perform predictive 
maintenance and optimize maintenance man hours.  These 
programs can also make possible rapid readiness assessment. 
In the future repairs can be streamline using electronic 
equipment configuration management and using a PADD that 
will view an integrated electronic technical manual for a 
particular component.  In the event of difficult repairs, 
teleconferencing with the original equipment manufacturer 
can replace expensive technical assist visits of the past. 
Redundancy in the fault tolerant system will theoretically 
reduce the maintenance urgency aboard the Autonomie Ship. 
(NSWC, 1993) 
E.  DAMAGE CONTROL 
The Autonomie Ship is projected to be designed for 
toughness using distributed fault tolerant systems. 
Designers recommend building fully habitable citadels 
(hardened structures) that are centrally located inside the 
ship to provide a safe haven for personnel prior to engaging 
the enemy.  The unmanned spaces will be inerted with a non 
flammable gas to remove or greatly reduce the likelihood of 
fire after a battle hit.  Finally the ship should be 
constructed using blast hardened structures. (NSWC, 1993) 
In battle, the designers propose employing "proactive 
damage control" using weapon sensors to predict where hits 
may occur prior to impact and automatically reconfigure 
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equipment to ensure reliability.  Once the hit is received, 
the ship sensors and computing system can perform a rapid 
damage assessment much faster than is currently possible. 
After the assessment, the system will prioritize the 
severity of damage and determine what to fix first.  With 
the hardened and distributed computer and robotics systems, 
remote isolation will occur quicker to suppress fire and 
flooding. 
F.  WARFARE 
The Autonomie Ship will be configured to deal with the 
war fighting tasks at hand.  The system will reconfigure for 
battle damage and failed items.  The system will create new 
inter-connection paths of sensors to computer to weapon 
engagement systems. (NSWC, 1993)  New levels of automation 
will surpass existing automation through improve combat 
systems integration.  The "open" systems will allow 
extension and inter-operability between currently 
incompatible systems such as radar, electronic warfare, and 
sonar, etc.  These advances will better aid warriors in 
"hard kill" (sinking an enemy ship) and "soft kill" 
(disabling an enemy radar system). 
G.  LOGISTICS 
Computer Aided Logistics System (CALS) will streamline 
maintenance at the ship, intermediate, and depot levels. 
The Autonomie Ship should allow for paperless maintenance by 
using automated job entry and integrated electronic 
technical manuals.  These features are projected by 
designers to yield man-hour savings.  A ship to shore or 
destroyer tender data link to prearrange repair services 
should improve logistical efficiency.  Inventory control can 
also be improved using an automated worldwide parts 
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availability and ordering system via data link using 
existing national stock numbers or original equipment 
manufacturer numbers.  The next data base improvement will 
involve bar coding components and equipment. (NSWC, 1993) 
This will vastly improve the efficiency in the existing 
configuration management system in the fleet and reciprocate 
into improved fleet maintenance. 
H.  ADMINISTRATION 
Designers foresee shore based administration data bases 
that be updated using on-line transaction procedures.  These 
procedures will be used for personnel, pay, medical, and 
dental records.  These configurations will remove the 
requirements for departmental yeomen because of computerized 
technical manuals and logs.  The other administrative 
personnel will be transformed into data entry and retrieval 
specialists. (NSWC, 1993) 
I.  COMMUNICATIONS 
External communications will be performed using the 
fully automated Copernicus System that is very versatile in 
frequency selection.  The system performs transmission over 
the entire Navy's radio communication spectrum whether 
satellite, VHF, HF, etc. (NSWC, 1993)  Internal 
communication will be performed using active transmitter 
devices for each crew member that will make possible instant 
personnel location.  This capability will greatly assist in 
man overboard or other danger situations.  The improvements 
in internal communication will involve information routing 
between consoles and command centers.  The system can also 
optimize between video and audio communications. (NSWC, 
1993)  This will eliminate a need for phone talkers between 
stations. 
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J.  TRAINING 
The Autonomie Ship computer system will feature 
embedded training.  The embedded training will be accessed 
from any station and interactive.  This training could allow 
shortened school pipelines for personnel prior to arriving 
on the ship that could lead to future personnel cost 
reductions.  Personnel may become more motivated to train 
and cross-train. (NSWC, 1993)  Overall crew readiness should 
improve in the respective areas (given the pertinence of the 
training).  Designers predict that training will be a 
managed asset.  This asset will become an important part of 
workload planning.  In the future, the training system 
aboard the Autonomie Ship will be capable of providing a 
readiness assessment for the entire ship. (NSWC, 1993)  This 
would eliminate a need for inspections by higher authority. 
If the computer has all of the training data bases and 
standards of objective criteria, it could perform the 
inspection.  The chain of command could access the 
individual ships' latest self generated training assessment. 
K.  PROPOSED MANNING REQUIREMENTS (FROM THE DESIGNERS) 
The designers for the Autonomie Ship hypothesized that 
manning requirements will be drastically reduced in 
comparison to existing ships.  The designers suggest that 
101 officers and enlisted persons will be needed to operate 
the ship in battle. (NSWC, 1993)  Of the 101, thirteen are 
officers and eighty-eight are enlisted.  The designers 
propose a different organizational structure from existing 
practice (Figure 4-1).  The hierarchy consists of a 
commanding officer and four department heads.  The 
departments will consist of information, combat systems, 
engineering, and supply. (NSWC, 1993)  Designers foresee the 
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information department to be composed of a computer division 
with one officer and three enlisted persons (1 DS, 1 DP, and 
1 E4 of any rate).  A human resources division will replace 
the existing executive department with one officer, and five 
enlisted personnel (1 PN, 1 YN, 1 DK, and 1 E4 of any rate). 
In the Autonomie Ship concept, the communications division 
will also be in the information department.  The division 
will have one officer and ten enlisted crew members (8 RM 
and 2 SM).  Finally, one chief petty officer will be 
employed in the medical division, which will also be 
included under the information department.  The combat 
systems department will possess a sensors division, a 
weapons division, and an operations division.  These 
divisions will all have one officer assigned.  The sensor 
division is projected to have twelve enlisted assigned (4 
STG, 2 FC [guns], and 6 FC [missiles])  The weapons division 
should have five enlisted personnel (2 GMM, 2 GMG, and 1 
TM).  The operations division is foreseen to have twenty- 
three enlisted personnel (12 OS, 4 EW, 3 ET, and 4 BM). 
Designers see the engineering department as having only two 
divisions, mechanical and electrical.  Each division will 
have one officer assigned.  The mechanical division will 
include nine enlisted persons (1 DC, 4 MM, and 4 GSM).  The 
electrical division will include eight enlisted members  (3 
EM, 3 GSE, 2 IC).  The supply department will be composed of 
two divisions also, food service and parts.  Designers see 
the divisions to be headed by chief petty officers (MS and 
SK respectively).  The food service division will be 
composed of seven additional enlisted persons (6 MS and 1 
SH).  The parts division will have an additional three 
enlisted crew members (3 SK). 
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Designers also included a proposed watch bill that 
theoretically could support four watch sections.  This watch 
bill required sixty personnel to staff the listed watch 
stations. (NSWC, 1993)  The watch bills included the 
"bridge/CIC" Command Center and the engineering Command 
Center.  Considerations for manning were made given the 
designer's constraints and not those of current Navy manning 
practice. 
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Figure 4-1 Autonomic Ship Organization and Requirements. 
INNOVATION CENtr:R ----------
L.  WRAP UP 
The Autonomie Ship demonstrators presented a concept of 
ship based on projected improvements in systems engineering, 
information technology, and relaxed organizational 
requirements.  No improvements in weapon systems or 
engineering equipment were listed in the briefing. 
Designers hope to prove that destroyers can be operated 
safely and reliably under the new manning and maintenance 
concepts with significantly fewer people.  The development 
team hopes to show the departmental officials that the Navy 
can meet mission requirements for less money.  Keys for 
these savings will come through advanced information 
processing and automation. 
Other presentations by similar research entities have 
presented similar warship concepts with advancements in 
mechanical and electrical technology.  Some of these 
concepts include proton exchange membrane (PEM) propulsion. 
(ARPA, 1994)  Weapons research is ongoing in the field of 
"directed energy" laser guns.  These are but two possible 
leaps in technology that may impact projected ship manning 
by the 2003 estimated start date of constructing the next 
generation U.S. Navy destroyer.  As discussed in Chapter II, 
if a new technology for visual LOS communication is employed 
by the Navy by 2003, then the ship can be designed 
differently and alter manning requirements. 
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V.  MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter synthesizes the information listed in 
Chapters III and IV to yield manpower requirement estimates 
of the next generation destroyer.  Many possible scenarios 
may unfold prior to developing and building the lead ship. 
The initial construction of the new class is tentatively 
planned to begin in 2003.  (Huchting, p49)  It is fair to 
say the actual manpower requirements and costs will be based 
upon the subsequent determination of the most appropriate 
scenario.  The three scenarios discussed will describe the 
manning requirements and costs in FY93 dollars, arguments 
supporting possible policy, and ramifications to be 
considered.  The ship development scenarios that may occur 
are: 
1. The information technology ideas of the Autonomie 
Ship have not matured or proven fruitful enough in 
operational development and testing phases by 2003. 
The lead ship will be built only with advanced 
information processing systems and transaction 
processing features.  Other ship systems remain similar 
but are incrementally improved over DDG 51 systems. 
Current organizational (administrative and maintenance) 
policies remain intact. 
2. Information technology ideas of the Autonomie Ship 
mature and prove fruitful during operational 
development and testing.  LOS visual communication 
devices are developed by 2003 and employed Fleet-wide 
by 2010.  Other ship system configurations remain 
similar but are incrementally improved over DDG 51 
systems.  Organizational policies remain intact. 
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3.  Information technologies mature and autonomic 
technology is employed.  Mechanical and electrical 
technologies have allowed new forms of propulsion and 
weaponry to be exploited aboard the new ship class. 
Organizational policies become relaxed through advances 
in communication technology.  Maintenance management 
adapts condition-based practices. 
A. BACKGROUND 
New technologies can have an impact on future manpower 
requirements.  This can be best analyzed by looking at the 
effects that these technologies will have on operations and 
maintenance of military systems themselves and on the 
infrastructure. (Binkin, pp. 39-40)  A major limiting factor 
in this study is projecting technical advances over the next 
eight to ten years.  The technology will have a tremendous 
impact on manpower requirements.  The tendency has been to 
underestimate manpower needs for future systems.  (Binkin, 
p40)  The Navy has many administrative and organizational 
constraints that add to shipboard personnel requirements. 
For example, the Navy uses the U.S. Postal Service and other 
parcel delivery entities in delivering mail and supply 
parts.  The Navy also provides extensive counseling for 
enlisted personnel in broad career development, advancement, 
and transition to civilian life.  Physical security 
requirements aboard ship require many man-hours of labor 
intensive administration and presence to ensure order.  Navy 
maintenance practices employ periodic and conditional 
actions to guarantee proper equipment reliability. 
Historical case studies have shown many of the time-based 
maintenance procedures worthwhile. 
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The Navy has experienced problems in underestimating 
manpower requirements in the 1970's with several ship 
classes.  One problem involved the DD 963 class, was 
building the warship with too few weapon systems.  A problem 
with the FFG 7 class surfaced when the Department of the 
Navy arbitrarily mandated the berthing (crew living 
quarters) capacity.  This was done to meet acquisition costs 
without fully accounting for maintenance and watch-standing 
work loads. (GAO, 1981, p33) 
In the 1970's the Navy adopted a weapon system (ship) 
substitution mix entitled High-mix and Low-mix.  This 
strategy refers to the need for highly capable and high- 
cost cruisers and destroyers to serve in areas of severe 
enemy threat.  Less capable and less costly ships (frigates) 
were expected to operate in areas where the enemy threat is 
less intensive. (GAO, 1981, pi)  The designers of the 
Autonomie Ship concept seek to integrate information 
technology and reduced organizational burden to substitute 
for manpower thereby reducing budgetary woes of the future 
Navy.  Unfortunately with the reductions in ship personnel 
allowing only minor maintenance, the shore maintenance 
establishment must be adequately staffed to perform the 
additional maintenance beyond the ship's force capability. 
This situation will likely resemble the Low-mix concept 
currently employed with the FFG 7 class maintenance plan. 
This possibility, however, may be a higher risk alternative 
than current fleet destroyer maintenance practices. 
According to the designers, the Autonomie Ship should allow 
capital-labor substitution and "increased" combat 
effectiveness.  Mechanical and electrical technology 
advances will prove advantageous and complementary to the 
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initial autonomic concepts.  However, maintenance 
requirements will not simply vanish.  Though some 
maintenance actions are quickly added to the fleet as a 
"reflex" reaction for "safety reasons," most maintenance 
practices in the fleet have evolved in a somewhat systematic 
manner based on data analysis. 
B.  SCENARIO ONE 
1.  Assumptions 
This situation reflects the worst case scenario in 
technical development of SC 21.  SC 21 will likely be as 
capable as or more than DDG 51.  SC 21 will employ similar 
weapons and engineering configuration to DDG 51.  This 
scenario assumes that the Navy is able to exploit office 
automation technology and on-line transaction processing for 
personnel and supply parts.  Though artificial intelligence 
is employed, it has not reduced watch station qualifying 
time or time required to perform divisional training. 
Electronic Navigation system has greatly reduced QM 
workload.  Unfortunately, the Navy requirement for manual 
chart keeping prevents reduction in QM personnel.  The 
current Navy policy mandates that manual charts will be kept 
to- ensure constant certainty of the "navigational picture." 
This scenario also assumes that original equipment 
manufacturers are unable to design and produce common 
digital interfaces for all monitoring and controlling 
equipment via a distributed computer prior to construction. 
The maintenance interface will prove cost effective in 
reducing trouble shooting time.  Cost savings will come from 
reduced technical assist visits. However, the interface 
fails to reduce personnel requirements. 
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2.  Manpower Requirements and Costs 
The Executive Department will see the largest personnel 
reductions as a result of office automation improvements. 
All departmental yeomen requirements will be eliminated 
Supply department will see a drop in SK requirements as CALS 
will reduce paper work burdens drastically in logistical 
functions.  RM requirements in the Operations Department 
will see reductions as a result of improve systems 
integration.  In this scenario, the Combat Systems 
Department will not see a significant reduction in personnel 
without a corresponding drop in material and combat 
readiness.  The Engineering Department will also not see a 
decline in personnel requirements. 
Officer manning will change very little in scenario 
one.  The Only changes are in quality of junior officers. 
The LDO officer requirements will be substituted with line 
junior officers and a Chief Warrant Officer. 
The total enlisted compliment of SC 21 will be 305 
enlisted personnel and twenty-three officers in this 
scenario as seen in Figure 5-1.  The total personnel 
requirements' cost of the SC 21 based on the mix in Appendix 
B are $17,989,437.48 (Figure 5-2).  These numbers reflect an 
overall reduction in ten enlisted personnel and zero 
officers.  The change in designator requirement for officers 
allows a slight reduction in officer costs.  Unfortunately, 
the enlisted crew members who are lost in the requirement 
reduction are relatively inexpensive compared to those who 
are retained. 
3.  Arguments and Ramifications 
This scenario represents a grim picture of ship 
development and acquisition by 2003.  Scenario one will 
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become a reality if the information technology synthesis is 
not managed efficiently.  This situation will also occur if 
original equipment manufacturers do not rise to the task. 
They must develop standardized digital signal converters for 
command and control of equipment using ä common fiber optic 
data and distributed processing network.  Another major item 
will make this scenario likely is caution on the part of 
policy makers.  Even with digital excellence, warfare 
commanders are skeptical of the risks involved with buying 
expensive weapon systems that can be pilfered or sabotaged 
by magnetic fields, electro-magnetic pulse (emp), or a 
computer hacker.  The commanders may argue that though the 
technology is magnificent, the risks far outweigh the 
benefits. 
If scenario one becomes reality, then the Navy can 
anticipate high demand for junior sailors to maintain 
staffing for warships.  This picture actually projects the 
least change from the status quo of ship manning 
requirements.  This situation will yield a relatively 
disappointing outlook for budget planners depending on the 
construction costs. Given a peace-time scenario, fewer of 
these relatively labor intensive ships will be built than 
they will be replacing (DD 963).  This scenario could lead 
to postponing SC 21 construction and reverting to a High-mix 
and Low-mix strategy again. 
C.  SCENARIO TWO 
1.  Assumptions 
The SC 21 will be the Autonomie Ship with DDG 51 
mission capability.  The Navy still maintains traditional 
organizational requirements.  The engineering and combat 
systems suites are highly automated.  Unfortunately, enough 
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reliable equipment operating data have not been collected to 
ensure enough equipment reliability.  Watch standing 
requirements are significantly reduced.  Interactive 
computer training does not prove to be a panacea for 
instilling knowledge in shipboard personnel.  Copernicus is 
fully employed and proves to be a very reliable and labor 
saving communications system.  The high performance 
distributed computing network proves to also be maintenance 
intensive in terms of hardware and software.  Policy makers 
in the design process will determine that human interface in 
the tactical decision process is necessary for safety 
reasons. A new LOS communication system is successfully 
implemented and proliferates throughout the fleet.  The 
bridge and CIC will be integrated. 
2.  Manpower Requirements and Costs 
The Operations department will see the largest 
reduction in troop strength as a result of the autonomic 
revolution in this scenario.  RM requirements are 
significantly reduced as a result of the Copernicus 
automated system.  The six SM requirements are eliminated as 
a result of the new LOS Communication system.  The ET 
requirements shift back to Operations Department because 
they will only maintain Operations Department equipment. 
The OS requirements are directly related to the number of 
consoles that require human monitoring.  EW requirements 
will reduce as the gear can now be monitored through a 
common digital network monitored by the OS or EW personnel. 
The BM rating will be least influenced by autonomic 
technology.  The SN rating will see lower numbers due to 
reduced look out requirements from the integrated bridge and 
CIC command center. 
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The Combat Systems department will feature a new 
division, the Computer Division.  The division will be 
divided into two work centers:  Hardware (DS rating) and 
Software (data processing technicians DP rating).  The DP 
personnel will manage the software distribution, programming 
function, and user support needs common with complex 
computer systems.  The DS rating will perform traditional 
maintenance and troubleshooting efforts as with past 
destroyer generations.  The department will see a small 
decrease in personnel.  FC and STG personnel requirements 
should drop due to the data interface into a unified digital 
system.  Sensor maintenance will keep requirements higher 
than projected by the Autonomie Ship briefer. 
The Engineering Department will experience reduction in 
watch standing requirements as a result of robotics.  On the 
other hand, maintenance requirements will not decrease as 
the robots demand monitoring and preventive maintenance. 
The department will see reductions in the number of GSM 
personnel.  Unfortunately the number of damage control 
equipment and sensors will increase and must be maintained. 
Damage control readiness will never be higher in the fleet 
aboard fossil fueled ships.  Personnel reduction savings 
will not be reaped as advertised by designers because of 
organizational constraints imposed by the Department of the 
Navy.  Arguably, the SC 21 is the most cost effective and 
battle ready platform to sail the high seas. 
The officer population will see twenty-one requirements 
divided along traditional lines.  Officers will pilot, 
fight, and control the ship.  A medical doctor is still 
required aboard the SC 21 for war.  This scenario also 
requires two Supply Corps officers aboard the ship.  Junior 
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officers will still report aboard as trainees.  Three LDO or 
CWO requirements will exist in this scenario for technical 
expertise. 
Total enlisted requirements will total 220 for the SC 
21 in this projection as reflected in Figures 5-1 and 5-2. 
The enlisted costs are estimated at $11,123,472.81 with the 
given quality mix.  If this scenario materializes, this will 
be the least expensive destroyer built since 1960 in terms 
of personnel costs.  The officer costs are projected at 
$2,325,309.76.  The combined officer and enlisted costs are 
$13,448,782.57. 
3.  Arguments and Ramifications 
This scenario presents a more likely technical picture 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  Even with 
the foreseen organizational constraints, significant savings 
can be for seen in FY93 dollars.  One must keep in mind that 
certain policies are not going to disappear for the sake of 
engineering (or in some cases military) efficiency.  It is 
reasonable to predict that ships with greater than 100 
personnel will have traditional administrative suite of 
executive assistants (MA, NC, PC).  They will assist the 
Executive Officer in his barrage of keeping the ship's 
bureaucracy functioning.  Also it is likely the QM rating 
will remain in force (though at reduced numbers) because the 
rating constantly practices critical maritime techniques. 
In the event of loss of data processing capabilities, this 
rating will still be able to ensure competent assistance to 
the officers who will "steer" the ship.  Demand for the DP 
personnel will almost certainly rise.  The DP's will be 
trained to manage and train personnel on computer software. 
They will possess very marketable skills that will probably 
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increase their cost to the Navy over time.  Though this ship 
is highly automated, there will still be large numbers of 
mechanical systems that will require maintenance and 
monitoring to support operations.  This fact will keep 
certain mechanical ratings in high demand (DC, EN, HT). 
Also, high skilled electronic workers will be needed to 
maintain certain computer operations, weapons, and 
engineering equipment (DS, ET, FC, GSE). 
Though the actual raw numbers of shipboard personnel 
requirements are declining, the Navy will still need large 
numbers of people.  The Navy will continue to need high 
quality personnel to train in the high skill jobs.  This 
could easily translate into higher recruiting and SRB costs 
depending on many factors.  Some of these factors include 
operating tempo, personnel rotation policies, attrition 
rates, etc. 
D. SCENARIO THREE 
1.  Assumptions 
SC 21 is constructed exploiting autonomic technology. 
A new directed energy laser gun and PEM propulsion are 
developed and employed aboard the ship.  SC 21 will also 
have VLS missile capability with similar capability and 
mission of the DDG 51.  The U.S. Navy relaxes its 
administrative policies and modifies the fleet maintenance 
policy to a condition basis.  The ship is reorganized 
functionally into four departments.  The Operations 
Department will encompass the Executive, Medical, and 
Navigation Departments.  The other departments remain as 
Combat Systems, Engineering, and Supply and they will 
perform traditional functions.  Though administrative 
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policies are now relaxed, the numbers of programs, policies, 
and reports have not declined. 
2.  Manpower Requirements and Costs 
All of the departments see an overall drop in 
personnel.  The administrative positions remain to ensure 
"law and order" and personnel counseling (MA and NC).  The 
Operations Department is still dominated by the requirement 
for OS personnel to staff tactical consoles and deck seamen 
to preserve the topside areas and perform manual labor.  The 
Operations Department has absorbed the computer software 
management personnel (ADP Division with DP and one DS) and 
an internal communications work center (IC rating.)  The 
former Executive departments are now the Human Resources 
Division. 
The Combat Systems Department is now composed of three 
major "elements."  The divisions are Sensors (search and 
fire control radar, sonar, and electronic warfare), Computer 
Hardware, and Ordnance (gun, missiles, and torpedoes).  The 
Sensors division is composed of the following ratings: ET, 
FC, STG, EW.  The Ordinance division is composed of the GM 
and TM ratings.  The laser gun could likely bring about a 
new sub-rating in the gunner's mate rating, gunner's mate 
electrical or laser.  The maintenance skills will probably 
be electrical and electronic intensive tasks in addition to 
some mechanical tasks.  The gunner's mate guns rating is 
more mechanical and hydraulic task intensive with only minor 
electronic labor requirements.  The FC and STG ratings will 
experience some reduction in requirements due to removal of 
many time based maintenance tasks.  The ET and EW ratings 
will probably not experience as much relative reduction in 
strength as the FC and STG ratings.  This is because the 
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hypothesized reductions obtained through application of 
autonomic technology reduced the requirements to an 
acceptable minimum.  The GM rating will see significant 
reductions from the previous scenarios based on the periodic 
maintenance change. 
The Engineering department will see some unusual 
changes in the main propulsion ratings.  The GSM and GSE 
ratings will be replaced by the MM and EM ratings.  The 
author assumes that the PEM propulsion is a form of cold 
fusion nuclear propulsion. (ARPA, 1994)  If nuclear 
qualified personnel (MM and EM) are required, then the 
Commanding Officer and Chief Engineer must be nuclear 
trained officers.  This scenario assumes that traditional 
nuclear power staffing policies still exist.  If however the 
propulsion equipment .does not require nuclear trained 
personnel, then the personnel costs will be significantly 
less.  Reductions will occur in all of the engineering 
divisions, if relaxed maintenance practices are adopted. 
The Auxiliary Division will again see the MM rating and 
reductions in overall personnel.  The Repair Division will 
also see a reduction in personnel. 
The Supply Department will see a small reduction in 
support personnel.  Most of the early reductions in the 
Supply Department came about from the advent of on-line 
transaction processing and CALS (SK and DK ratings.)  Though 
the SH rating is a labor intensive service rating, the Navy 
has consolidated and modified traditional practices to allow 
reductions in this rating.  The MS rating and associated non 
rated seamen and firemen personnel have decreased as a 
result of crew reductions. 
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The total enlisted manning requirements for the SC 21 
are projected as 174 enlisted personnel as shown in Figure 
5-1. Seventeen officers will be required aboard SC 21. The 
ensuing personnel costs are $9', 394,187.99 for the enlisted 
personnel. Officer costs are projected at $1,793,631.69. 
The combined personnel costs are $11,187,819.68 (Figure 5- 
2) . 
3.  Arguments and Ramifications 
Scenario Three presents the brightest picture in terms 
of personnel costs.  This scenario hinges on several 
technical factors proving fruitful.  This assumes that 
autonomic technology will be successful and accepted as a 
viable operating medium for destroyers in the future by Navy 
leadership.  Another option assumed is that the Navy will 
adapt a conditioned based maintenance system as opposed to 
the current periodic system that already has conditional 
factors mounted into it.  The final strong assumption is 
that the Navy will relax but not eliminate its sometime 
burdensome bureaucratic policies.  If the fleet adopts a 
relaxed maintenance policy similar to the Low-mix concept, 
then the shore maintenance facilities must be also taken 
into account when projecting the acquisition of the SC 21. 
If shore maintenance requirements are not taken into 
consideration prior to implementing the policy, then combat 
readiness will decrease from reduced material condition of 
the ships.  This scenario could, in theory, repeat the 
problems experienced in the FFG 7 implementation with higher 
costs in terms of dollars and military readiness.  The laser 
and PEM technology could theoretically become realities in 
the near future.  Unfortunately, they also may not prove to 
be as wonderful for military application as designers claim. 
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The Navy also does yet not have an accurate manner of 
performing a cost-effectiveness analysis to see if these 
technologies are any better than existing mechanical gun and 
fossil fuel practices. 
If the SC 21 in this scenario is produced and it 
requires nuclear trained personnel, the Navy will once again 
go into high volume nuclear training for enlisted and 
officer personnel.  If the ship builders determine that PEM 
propulsion does not require nuclear trained personnel, then 
the costs will be even cheaper that anticipated, given the 
accuracy of the personnel requirement estimations.  The 
disadvantage to using minimum-manned ships from an 
operator's standpoint is that personnel absences can 
severely hamper readiness and increase individual workload. 
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Figure 5-1 Comparison of Enlisted and Officer Manpower 
Requirements for SC 21 Based upon Three Scenarios. 
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E.  WRAP UP 
A comparison with recent destroyers assists in 
evaluating the projections of manpower requirements (Figure 
5-3).  The three projections decline according to the amount 
of progress in technology and removal of administrative 
burden. Personnel costs also decline over the series (Figure 
5-4).  None of the projections rival the reductions of the 
Autonomie Ship presentation manning predictions (Figure 5- 
5).  A departmental breakdown of the personnel requirements 
and costs are listed in Figures 5-6 and 5-7.  Simulated 
manning documents for each of the scenarios can be obtained 
from the author.  The three projections in this thesis 
consider a wide variety of many naval organizational and 
operational practices.  Some of these practices include the 
existing ship administrative structures, maintenance 
practices, warfighting modes, and training networks.  The 
final consideration in determining these manpower 
requirements will involve viewing anticipated labor supply 
elements.  The Navy is not expected to change its current 
practice of recruiting untrained personnel and "growing them 
into trained mariners."  The Navy hierarchical officer and 
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Destroyer Manning Trends, SC 21 Projections and Autonomie Ship 
Estimates 
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Figure 5-3 Comparison of Past Manpower Requirements and 
Three Projections of SC 21 Manning. 
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Figure 5-7 Comparison of Destroyer Manning Trends, SC 21 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis introduced a historical view of U.S. Navy 
Destroyers.  The view centered on mission and technological 
advances as a background for discussing their implications 
for destroyer manpower requirements.  It analyzes personnel 
trends of recent destroyer classes.  The study includes some 
design and technological ideas proposed for the next 
generation destroyer.  These ideas focused on implications 
for projecting manpower requirements.  Three generic 
scenarios loom in the future for Navy planners that will 
determine the manpower requirements for the next generation 
destroyer.  The individual ship requirements in turn have 
"macro" force level implications. 
Ultimately, the manpower requirements of the next 
generation will hinge upon technology.  Organizational 
constraints cannot be disregarded in this planning period. 
These constraints include corrective and preventive 
maintenance on equipment.  They also include watch standing 
and facilities maintenance.  The final organizational 
constraint is administrative support.  The "paper work" is 
not likely to go away. 
The analysis predicts that manpower requirements will 
decline with the next generation destroyer (Figure 6-1). 
This assumes that the ship will be built with a similar 
mission capability as the DDG 51.  Estimates vary according 
to the degree of advanced technology by the acquisition 
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Manpower Requirements Trends end Projections Through the Yeers 
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Figure 6-1 Manpower Requirements Trends and Projections 
Through the Years. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Navy can anticipate technology reducing manpower 
requirements.  The degree to which this will occur, however, 
is yet to be seen.  The technology must become applicable in 
the fleet prior to seeing the fruit of reduced labor 
requirements.  Before relaxing maintenance policies, the 
Navy must carry analyze pertinent material and operating 
data to evaluate the utility of the periodic maintenance 
employed by the fleet today.  This system was employed to 
improve and maintain readiness.  Abruptly stopping the 
existing maintenance programs or arbitrarily relaxing them 
could have serious degrading consequences.  The 
organizational administrative burdens will probably never 
cease.  Office automation has reduced the manpower formerly 
required to ensure efficiency in performing administration. 
The executive assistants (MA, NC, PC) serve useful purposes 
in easing administrative labor for a navy ship.  Eliminating 
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these positions aboard a destroyer would put excessive 
burden on the officers and detract from overall combat 
effectiveness. 
The anecdote of the FFG 7 saga, mentioned in Chapter V, 
should serve as a reminder of the pitfalls of arbitrarily 
assigning manpower requirements.  It was design to cost.  If 
SC 21 is design to cost also, these same risks could be at 
stake.  The FFG 7 "fix" was relatively cheap compared to 
today's and tomorrow's projections.  The stakes are high in 
terms of military readiness and naval service prestige. 
Naval Planners and engineers should remember that warships 
are not operated by licensed merchant mariners.  Warships do 
not perform the same mission in the same environmental 
conditions as merchant ships.  This statement does not imply 
that the Navy cannot employ any of the labor saving 
technology that merchants today already possess.  The Navy 
should continue invest in labor saving technology and 
research. 
Further analyses in this area of naval study could 
focus on key fiscal interrelationships of weapon platforms. 
The most obvious of the relationships are capital value, 
personnel requirement costs, and operations & maintenance 
costs.  These costs can be analyzed in respect to mission 
and operational tempo.  The analyses could yield 
quantifiable measures of effectiveness.  These measures 
could be applied to all major fleet assets in the Navy order 
of battle. 
The Navy has the potential to embark on landmark 
systems development (autonomic technology).  Ships have 
increased in capability, fire power, and (anecdotally) 
reliability since the advent of the U.S. Navy.  The IT 
113 
si t r oul t s
f t t rom erall bat
ss.
t  , enti hapter ,
l i er it l it
an er i ents. as st.
st , l t
.  as v par
' o orr ' r j t s.
er ili al r st .
aval l er i r l e ber t ars i
t r t icen erc ant ariners. arshi
t orm is i ental
dit erc ant i s. hi atem t t l
t a t pl r
ec t erchant rea ssess. a
l t st r ec
.
rt r l al u l
l ation e l o s.
ost i ion it l l ,
el re t sts, er t  ai t
sts. es st t is
erat l e o. l l i
antif l easur ss. es easur
l l l aj r t a r
attl .
a t nti l bar and ar
e ent on i l y). i
abilit , er, otall )
il t . . avy.
revolution is still opening up new possibilities for systems 
every day.  The Navy should exploit as much technology as it 
can afford fiscally and militarily.  The curious thing about 
computer technology is that computers are built and 
programmed by people.  The technology should then ease the 
person's work load or help in decision making.  Some person 
(or other device) must still feed the computer data to 
process.  Finally, a person still has to act on the 
processed information. 
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